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CIVIL PROCEDURE
I.

INTRODUCTION

This survey article highlights and discusses selected New Mexico appellate
court civil procedure opinions decided between September 30, 1989 and
August 31, 1990. During the survey period, New Mexico's appellate courts
handed down opinions in the following procedural areas: jurisdiction,
service of process/notice, pleadings, discovery, trials, judgments, preclusion
doctrines, relief from judgement, and appeals.
II.

JURISDICTION

During the survey period, New Mexico's appellate courts were faced
with both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction questions.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The supreme court considered whether a complaint's failure to state a
claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) deprived
the court of subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a default judgment.'
Previous New Mexico decisions conflicted with regard to the jurisdictional
impact of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint. Many New
Mexico cases stated that "failure to state a cause of action is jurisdictional
and [could] be raised for the first time on appeal.' '2 These decisions
suggested that failure to state a claim deprived the trial court "of jurisdiction to grant any relief [to a complainant] based on [a] defective or
legally insufficient claim." 3 However, many other New Mexico decisions
held that a judgment is not void, and therefore the court did not lack
based on the fact that a complaint fails to state a cause of
jurisdiction,
4
action.
This ambiguity in New Mexico regarding the court's jurisdiction when
a complaint fails to state a cause of action was settled in Sundance
Mechanical & Utility Corporation v. Atlas.5 A lien claimant sued to
foreclose a mechanic's lien. 6 The lien claimant sued the homeowners, the

A.

1. Sundance Mechanical & Util. Corp. v. Atlas, 109 N.M. 683, 789 P.2d 1250 (1990).
2. Martinez v. Research Park, Inc. 75 N.M. 672, 676-77, 410 P.2d 200, 203, overruled on other
grounds, Lakeview Investment, Inc. v. Alamogordo Lake Village, Inc., 86 N.M. 151, 520 P.2d 1096
(1974) (citing Campbell v. Smith, 68 N.M. 373, 362 P.2d 523 (1961)); see also Phillips v. Allingham,
38 N.M. 361, 363, 33 P.2d 910, 911 (1934) (the court stated that "failure of a complaint to state
a cause of action is jurisdictional").
3. Sundance, 109 N.M. at 688, 789 P.2d at 1255.
4. In re Field's Estate, 40 N.M. 423, 432, 60 P.2d 945, 950 (1936); Valenzuela v. Singleton,
100 N.M. 84, 666 P.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v.
Valenzuela, 100 N.M. 84, 666 P.2d 225 (1983); Mitchell v. Parham, 357 F.2d 723 (10th Cir. 1966);
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 540 F.2d
1039 (10th Cir. 1976).
5. Sundance, 109 N.M. 683, 789 P.2d 1250.
6. Id. at 684, 789 P.2d at 1251.
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general contractor, a subcontractor and other lien claimants. 7 The defendant subcontractor cross-claimed against the homeowner, and this crossclaim became the subject of the appeal.' In his cross-claim, the subcontractor failed to allege that he was a licensed contractor as required by
statute. 9 A default judgment was entered against the homeowners upon
their failure to answer the cross-claim.' 0 The homeowners argued on appeal
that the subcontractor's failure to allege that he was a licensed contractor
constituted a failure to state a claim and thus deprived the court of
jurisdiction."
Rejecting the homeowners' argument, the supreme court held that failure
to state a claim did not "interfere with or detract from the court's subjectmatter jurisdiction" and any cases suggesting the contrary were "illadvised."' 2 The court cited Bell v. Hood, 3 a United State Supreme Court
decision, which succinctly pointed out that a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim presented the court with a question of law that must be
decided after, and not before, the court assumed subject-matter jurisdiction
over the action. 4
In Sundance, the homeowners raised another jurisdictional argument
which the supreme court dismissed. The homeowners claimed that because
they had paid the general contractor in full before the subcontractor filed
a lien against their property, they had discharged the subcontractor's claim
"because the lien upon which it was founded had been discharged."' 5
The homeowners cited cases which held that "there are three jurisdictional
essentials necessary to the validity of every judgment: jurisdiction of [sic]
parties, jurisdiction of [sic] subject matter, and power or authority to
decide the particular matter presented.' 6 The homeowners claimed that
in the instant case, the court lacked the third jurisdictional "essential,"
i.e., the power or authority to decide the particular matter presented. 7
The homeowners reasoned that because mechanics' liens are created by
statute and a statute governed the validity of the claim, the "power or
authority" to determine the claim depended on the existence of a valid
claim. 8 The court quickly dismissed this argument because to accept such
an argument would make jurisdiction turn on the underlying validity of

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-30(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
10. Sundance, 109 N.M. at 685, 789 P.2d at 1252.
11. Id.

12. Id. at 689, 789 P.2d at 1256.
13. 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946).
14. The court also cited an Oklahoma decision which addressed the same point. The Oklahoma
court asked rhetorically: if a court does not acquire subject-matter jurisdiction until there are sufficient
facts to plead a cause of action, then who determines if there is a cause of action? Sundance, 109
N.M. at 689, 789 P.2d at 1256 (citing Abraham v. Homer, 102 Okla. 12, 16, 226 P.2d 45, 49
(1924)).
15. Sundance, 109 N.M. at 686, 789 P.2d at 1253.
16. Id. (citing Heckathorn v. Heckathorn, 77 N.M. 369, 371, 423 P.2d 410, 412 (1967); In re
Field's Estate, 40 N.M. 423, 427, 60 P.2d 945, 947 (1936)).
17. Id.

18. Id. at 687, 789 P.2d at 1254.
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a claim-"the very question to be determined by the court in the exercise

of its jurisdiction.' ' 9 The court's jurisdiction depended on "whether or
not it had power to enter upon the inquiry." 20 The court noted that the
distinction between "subject-matter jurisdiction" and "power and authority" delineated in older New Mexico decisions probably did not serve
any useful purpose and 'jurisdiction over the subject matter' [was]

commonly treated as a unitary topic." 21 While the court did not specifically
incorporate "power and authority" into "subject matter jurisdiction,"

the court said that "at this stage in the development of22the law one may
doubt that the distinction serves any useful purpose."

The debate in Sundance regarding the difference between jurisdiction
and merits in connection with a courts' authority to hear a case has
practical consequences for the practicing attorney. A defendant can receive
a valid default judgment if he fails to respond to a complaint even if
the complaint fails to state a valid cause of action. The only recourse

to such a default judgment is through a rule 60(b) motion.
In a second case decided during the survey period, the supreme court
had another opportunity to consider the question of subject-matter jurisdiction. In Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma,23 the supreme court addressed

the question of whether the state can exercise subject-matter jurisdiction
over a sovereign Indian tribe in connection with potential liability for

off-reservation business conduct. It is a well-recognized principle that a
state court cannot exercise jurisdiction over an Indian tribe unless there
is an effective waiver of the tribe's sovereign immunity or congressional

consent.24 Tribes have been found to waive immunity "by virtue of

legislative ordinances enacted under a tribal constitution.' '25 For example,
if a tribal corporate charter includes a "sue or be sued" provision, courts
have held that such a provision "constitutes a waiver of immunity for
the tribe as a corporate entity, although it does not waive the sovereign
immunity of the tribe as a political entity.' '26
In Padilla, the plaintiff, Padilla, sued the Acoma Pueblo, d/b/a Sky
City Contractors, for breach of contract for services performed on two

19. Id.
20. Id. (quoting State v. Patten, 41 N.M. 395, 399, 69 P.2d 931, 933 (1937)).
21. Id. (quoting M.E. OccmInvO, WALDEN'S CIVE. PROCEDURE IN NEW MExico at 1-3 to I-8
(2d ed. 1988)).
22. Id. Justice Ransom wrote a specially concurring opinion on this point. He argued that the
court should maintain the jurisdictional issue of power separate from the jurisdictional issue of subject
matter. Id. at 692, 789 P.2d at 1259. He pointed out that the court does have subject-matter
jurisdiction to consider evidence supporting the essentials of a statutory cause of action and that "a
defaulting party acts at his or her own peril in saying 'So What?' to a statutory cause of action
technically deficient but subject to proof as to all essential elements not admitted by the default."
Id.
23. 107 N.M. 174, 754 P.2d 845 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1029 (1989).
24. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
25. Merrion v. Jicarilla
26. Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Community, 455 F. Supp. 462 (D. Mont. 1978), aff'd, 642 F.2d
276 (9th Cir. 1981).
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roofing projects located off the reservation. 27 The Pueblo never incorporated under the Indian Reorganization Act; thus, it did not waive
immunity by legislative ordinance or under a corporate charter. 28 The trial
court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the
ground that the Pueblo was entitled to sovereign immunity. 29
On appeal, Padilla argued that the Pueblo could be sued under section
53-9-1 of the New Mexico Statutes, which includes a "sue or be sued"
clause in connection with the Pueblo's land grant.30 The court rejected
Padilla's argument and said that the legislature did not intend for the
"sue or be sued" clause in section 53-9-1 to operate as a waiver of Pueblo
immunity. 31 The history and the context of the statute justified the court's
interpretation. Specifically, the legislature enacted the statute while New
Mexico was a territory and, like the subsequent 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe
Hildago, the statute served to legally recognize pueblos and to provide
a means for them to protect Pueblo lands.3 2 "The territorial statute, which
clearly was enacted to protect the right of Indians to aboriginal lands,
cannot be extended to constitute a federal grant of general jurisdiction
' 33
over Indian tribes to the State.
In rejecting Padilla's argument, the court went on to note that there
is no federal law which precludes New Mexico from exercising jurisdiction
over an Indian tribe which conducts off-reservation business.3 4 Furthermore, the court stated that the state has the authority to disregard another
sovereign state's assertion of immunity. 3 5 Therefore, a state's decision to
recognize another state's sovereign immunity is "solely a matter of comity. "36
The court reasoned that because there is no constitutional law prohibiting
one state's exercise of jurisdiction over another state, and the exercise of
such jurisdiction is solely a matter of comity, the state has the option
of exercising jurisdiction over a sovereign Indian tribe for off-reservation
business.3 7 The court further noted that New Mexico generally disapproves
of sovereign immunity 38 and allows, for example, a breach of contract
action against the state.3 9 Similarly, therefore, the state could exercise
jurisdiction over a sovereign Indian tribe in connection with breach of
contract actions resulting from the tribe's off-reservation business. 40 The

27. Padilla, 107 N.M. at 175, 754 P.2d at 846.
28. Id. at 177, 754 P.2d at 848.
29. Id. at 174, 754 P.2d at 845.
30. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-9-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
31. Padilla, 107 N.M. at 177-78, 754 P.2d at 848-49.
32. Id. at 177, 754 P.2d at 848.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 179, 754 P.2d at 850.
35. Id. The United States Supreme Court affirmed California's jurisdiction over Nevada for a
wrong committed by Nevada in California. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 425 (1979).
36. Padilla, 1'07 N.M. at 179, 754 P.2d at 850; see also Hall v. University of Nevada, 8 Cal.
3d 522, 503 P.2d 1363, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973).
37. Padilla, 107 N.M. at 179, 754 P.2d at 850.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-23 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
40. Padilla, 107 N.M. at 179-80, 754 P.2d at 850-51.
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court remanded the case to the trial court to proceed with the breach of
contract action against the tribe. 4
B.

Personal Jurisdiction
During the survey period, the New Mexico Court of Appeals issued an
interesting opinion that touched on the controversial continued viability
of personal jurisdiction based solely on transient presence. In a custody
dispute entitled In re Laurie R. ,42 the mother was served while in New
Mexico. She argued that, in order for the court to gain personal jurisdiction
over her, minimum contacts must be met in addition to personal service
within the state. 43 She claimed that her presence in the state was involuntary
because she was allegedly in New Mexico solely for the purpose of regaining
custody of her child. 44 Therefore, the mother argued, the court should
recognize an exception to the
otherwise valid exercise of personal juris45
diction by personal service.
Personal service of process on the defendant while the defendant is
within the state is usually sufficient to establish the court's personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. 6 However, many scholars have questioned
the continued viability of personal jurisdiction based solely on transient
presence4 7 after the United States Supreme Court's decisions in International Shoe v. Washington4 and Shaffer v. Heitner.4 9 Although some
lower courts have decided that jurisdiction based on presence is no longer
valid in light of the contemporary due process requirements announced
in International Shoe and Shaffer, the validity of transient service is
still widely accepted." However, blind acceptance of transient-based jurisdiction is, without a doubt, waning. Even the United States Supreme
Court did not produce a majority opinion in2 a recent 1990 decision
involving the viability of transient jurisdiction.1

41. Id.
42. 107 N.M. 529, 760 P.2d 1295 (Ct. App. 1988).
43. Id. at 531, 760 P.2d at 1297.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See M.E. OccHL4ALINO, WALDEN'S CIVI PROCEDURE IN NEW MEXICO 1-23, 24 (2d ed. 1988).
47. Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal
Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 18, 25 (1982); Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After
World- Wide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729, 743-48 (1981); Vernon,
Single-Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner,
1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273.
48. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
49. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
50. Nehemiah v. Athletic Congress of USA, 765 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1985); Harold Pittman Co. v.
Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. I11. 1986); Bershaw v. Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App.
653, 700 P.2d 347 (1985).
51. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1073 (1987); Amusement
Equipment, Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985); Scholz Research & Dev., Inc. v. Kurzke,
720 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. 111. 1989); see also Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of
Marin, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2116 n.4 (1990).
52. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2105. Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and in part, White, found
that in personam jurisdiction based on presence was valid because it has been "immemorially the
actual law of the land . . . and therefor[el is due process of law." Id. at 2115. White concurred in
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In In re Laurie R., the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated that it
was not required to address the mother's personal jurisdiction arguments,
presumably because the mother was served while in the state, but did a
minimum contacts analysis anyway. 3 The court's analysis determined that
minimum contacts were sufficient for the state to exercise personal jurisdiction over the mother without offending traditional notions of. fair
play and substantial justice. 4 The action of the court reflects the current
debate about the possibility that personal jurisdiction based only on service
of process may not be valid, particularly if presence in the state is truly
involuntary and transient and the defendant has not established minimum
contacts with the forum state. 5
III. SERVICE OF PROCESS/NOTICE
In the area of service of process/notice, this survey period found the
New Mexico appellate courts handing down decisions addressing constructive notice, publication of notice and adequacy of notice. The New Mexico
Supreme Court also interpreted the notice requirement of a hospital lien
statute.
The New Mexico appellate courts had several opportunities to interpret
the validity of constructive notice. New Mexico has interpreted constructive
notice in accordance with the federal standards enunciated in two distinguished decisions. The governing standard New Mexico attorneys follow
6
is that set out in rule 4 of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure.17
This past year, the New Mexico Supreme Court reinstated the Mullane
standard, requiring that constructive notice be served in a manner rea-

Scalia's support of personal jurisdiction by service in the forum state because of its long history and
acceptance in this country. Id. at 2119. Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor disagreed with
Scalia's notion that a jurisdictional rule such as transient jurisdiction comports with due process
solely because of its historical "pedigree." Id. at 2120. They advocated that an "independent inquiry
into the . . . fairness of the prevailing in-state service rule" must be undertaken. Id. at 2120. Lastly,
Stevens concurred but felt that Scalia and Brennan both went too far in their opinions. Id. at 2126.
53. In re Laurie R., 107 N.M. at 531, 760 P.2d at 1297.
54. Id. The mother had previously come to New Mexico twice to regain custody of her child.
Id. She finally asked the Department of Human Services for assistance and consented to an order
giving the Department custody. Id. She later contested the order. At some point, the mother remained
in New Mexico to participate in a local treatment plan pursuant to court order. Id.
55. A Georgia Supreme Court decision reversed a trial court's holding that the Georgia Code,
which allows personal jurisdiction to be based only on temporary presence in the state, is an
unconstitutional infringement of the fourteenth amendment. The supreme court upheld jurisdiction
by personal service. Minimum contacts is an alternative to presence and is not necessary if a person
is served while actually present in the state. Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22
(1980).
56. N.M. R. Crv. P. 1-004 provides that a summons may be served by first-class, postage prepaid mall together with two copies and an acknowledgement form. The acknowledgement form must
be returned within 20 days. If mall is not available, a summons may be served by personal service
or by leaving the summons at the location where the defendant lives, or service may be made by
"posting such copies in the most public part of the defendant's premises, and by mailing to the
defendant at his last known mailing address copies of the process." Id. 1-004(F)(1).
57. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The Court held that
due process requires that reasonable efforts to provide notice to persons whose interests are to be
determined be made. The method of notice must have a reasonable prospect of giving actual notice
and there must be mailed notice to those persons whose addresses are known because the mail is
an efficient and inexpensive means of communication.
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sonably calculated to bring the proceeding to the defendant's attention.
Mullane established the well-recognized procedure used in providing constructive notice. 8 Constructive notice includes every type of notice, except
personal notice, including publication in the newspaper. The court estabfor a court to use in determining the validity of
lished a balancing test
59
constructive notice.
Consistent with Mullane, New Mexico has long recognized that service
must be reasonably calculated to ensure notice. New Mexico first used
the Mullane analysis in Abarca v. Henry L. Hanson, Inc.60 In Abarca,
the court held that fundamental due process requires that service be
reasonably calculated to give parties notice. 61 Moreover, the lack of notice
cannot be cured by 62an entry of a general appearance after an entry of
a default judgment.
However, in 1978, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that substitute
service of process must be strictly construed. 63 In contrast to Mullane,
the court in Moya v. Catholic Archdiocese (Moya I) held that public
posting of notice to a screen door is insufficient for effective notice.6
Moya I involved a quiet title action in which a default judgment was
entered for the defendants and against the Archdiocese. 6 The court's
analysis in Moya I focused on Mullane, which required that a summons
be "served in a manner reasonably calculated to bring the proceedings
to the defendant's attention."6 The court reasoned that an occupant
would not reasonably expect to find important legal documents on a
screen door and that a rubber band was hardly a secure means of attaching
such documents. 67 The Moya I court decision resulted in a restricted
Mullane standard of "reasonably calculated" in order
interpretation of the
68
to ensure fairness.
The New Mexico Supreme Court reinstated the Mullane standard for
effective notice in Moya v. Archdiocese of Santa Fe (Moya II).69 In Moya
II, the court overruled the Moya I holding regarding the requirements
for effective notice. Following a set-aside entry of default judgment for
the Moyas, extensive litigation ensued, and Moya H was heard on appeal
to the New Mexico Supreme Court.
In Moya II, the court discovered that the Moyas had lied in the earlier
action in order to win their lawsuit. 70 In Moya I, the Moyas had actually

58. Id.
59. Id.at 314-15.
60. 106 N.M. 25, 738 P.2d 519 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 7, 738 P.2d 125 (1987).
61. Id. at 26, 738 P.2d at 520.
62. Id.
63. Moya v. Catholic Archdiocese of N.M., 92 N.M. 278, 279, 587 P.2d 425, 426 (1978), rev'd,
107 N.M. 245, 755 P.2d 583 (1988).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 279-80, 587 P.2d at 426-27.
67. Id. at 279, 587 P.2d at 426.
68. Id.
69. 107 N.M. 245, 755 P.2d 583 (1988).
70. Id. at 246, 755 P.2d at 584.
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found the documents on the day of service but alleged that they did not
find the documents until months later.7 Upon discovery of the deceit,
the supreme court reviewed Moya I and noted that "[ajlthough the 'law
of the case' doctrine generally binds an appellate court to rulings on
questions of law made in a previous appeal, . . [the court] will not
apply the doctrine here ' 72 because application of the doctrine would result
in "a manifestly unjust decision." ' 73 The court concluded that the summons
in Moya I was served in a "manner reasonably calculated to bring the
proceeding to the defendant's attention. '74 Further, the court maintained
that whether a summons is served in a manner reasonably calculated to
attention depends upon the facts
bring the proceedings to the defendant's
75
and circumstances of each case.
The supreme court reinstated the default judgment against the Moyas,
holding that the notice attached to the screen (constructive notice of
foreclosure) was sufficient. 76 The court's holding reinstated the Mullane
holding that constructive notice may be sufficient notice.
Mullane was also considered by the New Mexico Court of Appeals
during the survey period. In Mullane, the United States Supreme Court
held that publication notice is not reasonable if the names and addresses
of the defendants are reasonably ascertainable. 77 In Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams, 7 the Court refined Mullane and held that publication
can never be reasonable if the plaintiff can notify the defendants of the
action by mail. 79 In Mennonite, the Court said that the plaintiff must
use means likely to ensure that the defendant receives actual notice,
particularly if there is reason to know the name and address of the
defendant.8 0 The Court in Mennonite held that publication of notice of
a proposed tax sale was insufficient."' Further, Mennonite also held that
due process requires that any party having an interest in property subject
to a tax sale must be either notified by mail or in a manner reasonably
calculated to ensure actual notice to that party if his name and address
are reasonably ascertainable.82
Both the Mullane and Mennonite criterion were referenced by the New
Mexico Court of Appeals in Fulton v. Cornelius.8 3 In Fulton, the court
examined the constitutional requisites for the notice required to be given

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
on file
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 247, 755 P.2d at 585.
Id. at 248, 755 P.2d at 586 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
462 U.S. 791 (1983) (if property is sold for nonpayment of taxes, a mortgagee with a mortgage
with the county recorder is entitled to notice).
Id.at 797.
Id.
Id.
Id.
107 N.M. 362, 758 P.2d 312 (Ct. App. 1988).
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by tax officials prior to the tax sale of property."4 In Fulton, the court
held that reasonable notice also includes reasonability with respect to a
deceased person when the tax official has reason to know of the death. 85
The facts in Fulton are similar to those in Mennonite. Following the
decedent's death, her grandson, Billy Fulton (Fulton), filed proof of his
appointment as executor of the decedent's estate in Lincoln County, as
required by New Mexico law. 86 Fulton also paid the estate's delinquent
taxes and requested that all of the deceased's mail be sent to him at his
Floydada, Texas address. 7 County officials cashed the check for taxes
and mailed a receipt to his address.8 8 When property taxes were not paid
the following year, county officials sent two notices of the pending tax
sale to the decedent's prior address, and both notices were returned as
undeliverable.8 9 The State Taxation and Revenue Department subsequently
auctioned the decedent's property in order to satisfy a tax lien.9° Fulton
brought an action to set aside the sale, alleging that the sale was void
because the State Taxation and Revenue Department filed improper notice. 9'
Following the analytical framework of Mennonite, the Fulton court
held that due process requires that when the Taxation and Revenue
Department has reason to know that an owner of property subject to a
delinquent tax sale is deceased, reasonable notice must be given to the
decedent's personal representative. 92 The court reasoned that due process
requires notice to all persons who are parties to an action. 9 In Fulton,
because the records were on file in the probate and estate offices, the
records were easily ascertainable and the parties should have received
notice 4
Next, the court held that if the personal representative's address is
readily ascertainable, then the Taxation and Revenue Department must
give the representative actual notice. 95 In this case, the Taxation Division
had reason to know of the decedent's death because the information was
on file in the estate records. 96 The state should have checked the estate
records on file with the Property Tax Division or the Probate Office of
Lincoln County when the notices were returned.Y The court further concluded that the Taxation Division could have ascertained the representative's address from the court records. 98 The state's failure to check the

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 366, 758 P.2d
Id. at 363, 758 P.2d
Fulton, 107 N.M. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at 363, 758 P.2d
Id.at 364, 758 P.2d
Id. at 366, 758 P.2d
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 367, 758 P.2d

at 316.
at 313; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-4-204 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
364, 758 P.2d at 314.
at 313.
at 314.
at 316.

at 317.
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estate records and obtain the representative's name and address invalidated
the tax sale. 99
The New Mexico courts also considered the adequacy of notice in a
case of a sale under execution and foreclosure. Production Credit Association of Southern New Mexico v. Williamson'00 involved an appeal
of a trial court's refusal to set aside a special master's foreclosure sale
of real property. 01' Production Credit published notice of the sale in the
newspaper for four weeks pursuant to state law. 0 2 The Williamsons alleged
that they were entitled to personal, actual notice of the time and place
of the foreclosure sale pursuant to rule 1-005 of the New Mexico Rules
of Civil Procedure and state law. 03
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court noted that state law specifically addresses the kind of notice required in cases of sales under
execution and foreclosure. 1° The applicable New Mexico statute is section
39-5-1.105 The court reasoned that because section 39-5-1 specifically provides for notice under sales of execution and foreclosure and rule 1-005
°
there is a conflict between statutes,
does not, the statute governs. 1'When
the court said, the more specific statute is considered an exception to the
general statute.' °7 In this case, the court found that Production Credit
had met the requirements of section 39-5-1.108
Despite the fact that Production Credit had met the requirements of
section 39-5-1, the Williamsons claimed that the notice required by state
law was not adequate to satisfy the due process requirements of both the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and to the New
Mexico Constitution. 109 They maintained that, as property owners with a
recorded interest and known address, they were entitled to actual notice
of the foreclosure sale pursuant to Mullane and Mennonite."0
Rejecting the Williamsons' argument, the court held that Mullane and
Mennonite referred to interests of mortgagees or holders of an interest
in the foreclosed property."' Because the Williamsons were mortgagors
and had actively participated in the foreclosure sale, the court found that
the decree itself gave the Williamsons sufficient notice of the impending
foreclosure sale."12 Thus, the court held that constructive notice of the
foreclosure sale was sufficient, and the property owners were not deprived
of their due process rights." 3

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 366, 758 P.2d at 316.
107 N.M. 212, 755 P.2d 56 (1988).
Id.
Id. at 213, 755 P.2d at 57.
Id.; see N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-005; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-5-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
Production Credit Ass'n, 107 N.M. at 213, 755 P.2d at 57.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-5-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
Production Credit Ass'n, 107 N.M. at 213, 755 P.2d at 57.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 213-14, 755 P.2d at 57-58.
Id. at 214, 755 P.2d at 58.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 215, 755 P.2d at 59.
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In one final notice case, Southwest Community Health Services v. Safeco
Insurance Co.," 4 the court construed for the first time the "home office"
provision of the hospital lien statute, section 48-8-2(C) of the New Mexico
Statutes." 5 In Southwest, the court addressed the issue of whether the
6
notice requirement of the hospital lien statue must be strictly construed."
The court determined that substantial
compliance with the notice require17
ments of the statute is sufficient.
Thomas L. Day ("Day"), defendant-appellant, was involved in an auto
accident caused by Marshall Graybill, a non-party in this suit." 8 Marshall
Graybill was insured by Safeco Insurance Company ("Safeco"), defendantappellant." 9 Southwest Community Health Services ("Southwest"), plain20
tiff-appellee, operated a hospital which furnished medical services to Day.'
As a result of those services, Day incurred $60,000 in medical expenses.' 2 '
Southwest filed a notice of lien for the medical expenses with the clerk
22
of the court pursuant to section 48-8-2(A) of the New Mexico Statutes.
On March 2, 1981, Southwest sent a copy of the notice to Safeco's local
office in Albuquerque, rather than Safeco's home office in Seattle, Washington. 123 On October 31, 1981, Safeco's local adjustor died. 24 On April
2, 1982, Safeco settled Day's claim against Safeco for Day's insurance
policy limits. 25 On June 22, 1982, Safeco representatives found a copy
of Southwest's notice in the adjustor's file. 26 Southwest was unable to
collect from Day the charges which he had incurred and demanded payment
from Safeco. 27 Safeco refused to pay, and Southwest filed a lawsuit. 21
The trial court granted summary judgment to Southwest in the amount
of $15,000, plus attorney's fees and costs. 129 Safeco appealed, contending
130
that the provisions of the hospital lien statute must be strictly construed.
Safeco argued that Southwest did not comply with the provisions of the
statute because it did not mail a copy of the notice of lien to Safeco's

114. 108 N.M. 570, 775 P.2d 1287 (1989).
115. Id. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-8-2(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1987) states:
No hospital lien is effective upon damages recovered for personal injuries unless:
C. the hospital mails a copy of the written notice [of lien] by certified mail with

return receipt requested to the home office of any insurance carrier that has insured

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

the person [alleged to be liable to the insured party for the injuries received] ...
if the name and address is known.
Southwest, 108 N.M. at 571, 775 P.2d at 1288.
Id. at 572, 775 P.2d at 1289.
Id. at 570, 775 P.2d at 1287.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 571, 775 P.2d at 1288; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-8-2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
Southwest, 108 N.M. at 571, 775 P.2d at 1288.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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home office; thus, Southwest's lien never attached. 3 ' Safeco further argued
that it never received actual notice of the lien and stated that the trial
court erred by not deducting Day's attorney's fees from the $15,000
sum. 132

On appeal, the court determined that Safeco's argument was incorrect
under the facts of the case and affirmed the trial court's decision.' 33 The
court held that although Southwest did not strictly comply with the
statutory notice provision, it nonetheless substantially complied with the
statute based on information given to Southwest by Safeco's agent, the
adjustor. 134 Testimony revealed that Safeco's adjustor told Southwest to
send any information about Day's charges to Safeco's Albuquerque office. 35 Based on this testimony, the court concluded that Safeco did have
notice of the lien and that Southwest was entitled to rely on this inforthat substantial, rather than strict,
mation. 36 The court further concluded
37
'
statute.
the
satisfied
compliance
IV. PLEADINGS
With regard to pleadings, New Mexico appellate courts addressed issues
concerning constructive appearance and limitation of actions.
Constructive Appearance
In Merrill v. Tabachin, Inc. ,138 an action was brought for breach of
contract in the purchase of real property.13 9 The New Mexico Supreme
Court considered whether an attorney, who did not communicate with
or file any pleadings with the district court but did send communications
to opposing counsel, constructively appeared, thereby entitling the attor4°
ney's client to written notice prior to the entry of a default judgment.'
Under prior law, a party entered a constructive appearance if the party
was aware of the pending lawsuit and manifested an intent to submit to
the court's jurisdiction." 4 A party who has entered an appearance in a
pending proceeding is entitled to receive a written notice before a court
hearing on the opposition's application for default judgment. 42 If a moving43
party fails to give such notice, the default judgment can be set aside.
Tabachin, Inc. allegedly contracted in 1986 to purchase the Merrill
Ranch. 44 On January 9, 1987, Merrill's attorney, Mr. Rowley, filed suit

A.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 572, 775 P.2d at 1289.
Id.
Id. at 571, 775 P.2d at 1288.
Id.
Id.at 572, 775 P.2d at 1289.
107 N.M. 802, 765 P.2d 1170 (1988).
Id.
Id.
See Mayfield v. Sparton Southwest, Inc., 81 N.M. 681, 682, 472 P.2d 646, 647 (1970).
Rodriguez v. Conant, 105 N.M. 746, 748, 737 P.2d 527, 529 (1987).
Id.
Merrill, 107 N.M. at 803, 765 P.2d at 1171.
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against Tabachin for breach of the purchase contract. 45 Tabachin was
served on January 29, 1987.146 Richard Olson agreed, in a letter sent to
Tabachin, to represent Tabachin in the suit. 147 Olson then called Rowley
to get an extension of time for filing an answer. 48 A few weeks later,
Dale Ek ("Ek") called Rowley and indicated that Ek had been retained
to initiate negotiations on behalf of Tabachin. 14 9 On March 18, 1987,
Rowley wrote both Ek and Olson insisting on "some action" by March
25.150

Olson subsequently informed Tabachin of Rowley's letter and requested
that Tabachin clarify Olson's status as Tabachin's attorney."' In an indirect
communication to Olson's secretary, Tabachin requested that his file be
returned to him. s2 Olson sent the file, together with the summons and
complaint, to Tabachin. l11 Olson believed that he no longer represented
Tabachin. 4 Olson never filed an entry of appearance or an answer, and
he made no further attempts to communicate with Rowley, Ek, or Ta-

bachin .

5

On March 25, 1987, Rowley sent another letter to Ek and Olson
demanding action.5 6 After neither attorney responded to Rowley's letter,
Rowley filed a certificate of default on April 2, 1987. I1 7 After the May
7, 1987 hearing, the trial court granted Merrill a default judgment.' In
June 1987, Tabachin attempted to sell some of its land, but was prevented
from warranting clear title because of the judgment filed by Merrill.' 9
1
On December 19, 1987, Ek moved to set aside the default judgment. 60
Tabachin's first argument was that Merrill was required to give written
notice to Tabachin prior to obtaining a default judgment because Tabachin's attorney had constructively appeared in the lawsuit.' 6 ' The supreme
court acknowledged that a formal appearance is unnecessary if a party
has entered a constructive appearance. 62 In this case, Tabachin did not
enter a constructive appearance and was therefore not entitled to written
notice prior to a hearing on the plaintiff's application for default judgment. 16 3
In reaching this result, the court adopted a two-prong test, established

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 804, 765 P.2d at 1172.
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in Mayfield v. Sparton Southwest, Inc. ,'164 for determining whether a party
has entered a constructive appearance.
To determine whether a party has entered a constructive appearance,
the court looks at the following: (1) the party's actions, to determine if
the party was aware of the pending lawsuit; and (2) whether the party
manifested an intent to submit to the court's jurisdiction.1 65 The court
found that Tabachin and his agents had satisfied the awareness element
of the test because of the communications with and among the attorneys. 6
However, the court did not believe that these acts satisfied the intent
requirement because neither Tabachin nor its agents or attorneys made
7
any attempt to communicate with the court or file any pleadings. 6 The
supreme court decided that mere awareness of the pending lawsuit is
insufficient to meet this test. 61 Instead, the party must have taken some
affirmative action to notify169the court that the party intended to submit
to the court's jurisdiction.
In Sun Country Savings Bank of New Mexico v. McDowell,7 0 the
supreme court applied its holding from Merrill regarding constructive
appearance. 171 The McDowells questioned whether an attorney representing
them because
them had real or apparent authority to actually represent
72
he did not enter a formal appearance on their behalf.
In November 1987, James Kennedy, an attorney for the McDowells,
attended a hearing on Sun Country's motion for presentment and partial
summary judgment against M.O.B., a co-defendant of the McDowells
and a judgment creditor of Jack McDowell. 17 At the hearing, Kennedy
stated to the court that he represented the McDowells. 174 Almost a month
later, Kennedy attended a hearing on M.O.B.'s motion for reconsideration
of a summary judgment granted by the trial court against M.O.B. 75 The
court first considered another attorney's motion to withdraw his firm
from its original representation of the McDowells .176 In response, Kennedy
informed the court that he agreed to the withdrawal and that he had
appeared before the court on behalf of the McDowells in another matter
in the case. 177 Kennedy later stated that his appearance was limited to
representing the McDowells in connection with Sun Country's motion for

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

81 N.M. 681, 472 P.2d 646 (1970).
Id. at 682, 472 P.2d at 647.
Merrill, 107 N.M. at 804, 765 P.2d at 1172.
Id.
Id.
Id.
108 N.M. 528, 775 P.2d 730 (1989).
Id. at 532, 775 P.2d at 734.
Id. at 531, 775 P.2d at 733.
Id. at 532, 775 P.2d at 734.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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M.O.B. 178 Kennedy entered his appearance
summary judgment against
1 79
orally before the court.
The court held that Kennedy satisfied both prongs of the Merrill test
used to establish a party's constructive appearance. 80 Kennedy satisfied

the "awareness" prong because he was aware of the lawsuit against the
McDowells. The "intent" prong was satisfied because Kennedy showed
an intent to appear when he appeared as counsel of record for the
McDowells at two hearings concerning the entry of partial summary
judgment against M.O.B. Thus, Kennedy had entered a constructive appearance on behalf of the McDowells." 8'
B.

Limitation of Actions
During the survey period, New Mexico courts made several important
rulings on statutes of limitation and other time limitations in litigation.
New Mexico courts have adhered to the rule that, absent a statute to the

contrary, parties to a lawsuit cannot toll an applicable statute of limitations
during the pendency of a previous action later dismissed without prejudice.' 82 New Mexico decisions hold that a party cannot deduct the time
dismissed without prejudice to
consumed by a previously pendent claim,
1 83

him, from the statute of limitations.

The New Mexico statute which can toll a statute of limitations is section

37-1-14 ("the tolling statute").184 The tolling statute acts to toll the statute
of limitations on a cause of action if a new suit is brought within six
months after the dismissal of the first suit. 85 The tolling statute is not
unlimited. By its terms, the statute does not apply to claims dismissed

for "failure to prosecute.

1186

The tolling statute is further limited in its

statute does
application by section 37-1-17, which states that the tolling
87
not apply to time limits imposed by a separate statute.

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Diebold Contract Servs. v. Morgan Drive Away, Inc., 95 N.M. 9, 617 P.2d 1330 (Ct. App.
1980) (court held that the time taken for appeal does not toll the statute of limitations), overruled
on other grounds sub nom. Bracken v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 107 N.M. 463, 760 P.2d 155 (1988);
Estate of Gutierrez v. Albuquerque Police Dep't, 104 N.M. 111, 717 P.2d 87 (Ct. App.) (court
refused to toll the statute of limitations for the time consumed by a plaintiff who filed suit in state
district court after the same action was previously dismissed without prejudice in a claim pendent
to a civil rights action in federal court), cert. denied, 103 N.M. 798, 715 P.2d 71 (1986), overruled
on other grounds sub nom. Bracken v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 107 N.M. 463, 760 P.2d 155 (1988);
Ortega v. Shube, 93 N.M. 584, 603 P.2d 323 (Ct. App. 1979) (court held that a workers' compensation
claim that is filed within the statutory period of limitations and subsequently dismissed for improper
venue cannot be refiled if the statute has run), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Bracken v.
Yates Petroleum Corp., 107 N.M. 463, 760 P.2d 155 (1988).
183. Bracken v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 107 N.M. 463, 465, 760 P.2d 155, 157 (1988) (citing 51
AM. JUR. Limitation of Actions § 311 (1970)).
184. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-14 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. § 37-1-17. The tolling statute reads: "If, after the commencement of an action, the
plaintiff fail therein for any cause, except negligence in its prosecution, and a new suit be commenced
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The tolling statute was construed in the 1990 supreme court decision
188
of Gathman-Matotan Architects & Planners, Inc. v. New Mexico. In
Gathman, the court held that a breach of contract action brought against
the state pursuant to section 37-1-23(B), and subsequently dismissed without
prejudice for failure to prosecute, could not be refiled pursuant to the
tolling statute.8 9 Gathman, the plaintiff, filed a breach of contract suit
against the state a few days before the statute of limitations ran, but
then did nothing to pursue its claim. 190 The trial court dismissed the case
without prejudice for "failure to prosecute."' 191 Gathman appealed and
the dismissal was affirmed. 92 While the appeal was pending, Gathman
filed a second suit claiming that the second suit was a continuation of
the first and that the statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency
suit with
of the first action. 193 The district court dismissed the second
194
prejudice, holding that the statute of limitations had run.
On appeal, Gathman asserted that its action was not time barred because:
(1) the tolling statute operated to toll the two-year statute of limitations
in section 37-1-23; and (2) the exception in the tolling statute to cases
dismissed for "negligence in prosecution" did not apply because its suit
was dismissed for "failure to prosecute."' 95 The court rejected both arguments. First, the court held that the tolling statute is not applicable
to actions which are specifically limited by a separate statute. 19 Gathman's
breach of contract action against the state was specifically limited to a
two-year statute of limitations by section 37-1-23.191 Second, even if the
tolling statute was applicable to Gathman's action, Gathman could not
invoke it to toll its time limitation because Gathman's claim was dismissed
is "functionally the same as dismissal for
for failure to prosecute, which
198
negligence in prosecution."'

within six months thereafter, the second suit shall, for the purposes herein contemplated, be deemed
a continuation of the first." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-14 (emphasis added). Section 37-1-14 has been
construed to apply "only to the subject matter of the particular act," i.e., the act giving rise to
the first cause of action. Benally v. Pigman, 78 N.M. 189, 194, 429 P.2d 648, 653 (1967). Section
37-1-14 has been held inapplicable to the Tort Claims Act statute of limitations, Estate of Gutierrez
v. Albuquerque Police Dep't, 104 N.M. 111, 114, 717 P.2d 87, 90 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 103
N.M. 798, 715 P.2d 71 (1986), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Bracken v. Yates Petroleum
Corp., 107 N.M. 463, 760 P.2d 155 (1988); inapplicable to the workers' compensation statue of
limitations, Ortega v. Shube, 93 N.M. 584, 587, 603 P.2d 323, 326 (Ct. App. 1979), overruled on
other grounds sub nom. Bracken v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 107 N.M. 463, 760 P.2d 155 (1988);
and inapplicable to Wrongful Death Act statutes of limitation, Perry v. Staver, 81 N.M. 766, 769,
473 P.2d 380, 383 (Ct. App. 1970).
188. 109 N.M. 492, 787 P.2d 411 (1990).
189. Id. at 495, 787 P.2d at 414.
190. Id. at 492, 787 P.2d at 411.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 493, 787 P.2d at 412.
196. Id.
197. Id. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-23(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1990) provides: "Every claim permitted by
this section shall be forever barred unless brought within two years from the time of accrual."
198. Gathman, 109 N.M. at 494, 787 P.2d at 413. The court had previously commented on this
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In 1988, the court was presented with a workers' compensation statute
of limitations question which clearly fell outside the gambit of section
37-1-14.199 In Bracken v. Yates Petroleum Corp., the plaintiff argued that
the statute of limitations for her action was tolled because the trial court
erred by failing to transfer her claim to a court with proper venue. 200
The court decided to toll the applicable workers' compensation statute
of limitation, but did so under an equitable theory of tolling. 20 1 The
supreme court held that the statute of limitations in a workers' compensation action is tolled when a plaintiff files in the wrong venue and her
claim is then dismissed without prejudice after the statute of limitations
has run.202
In Bracken, the plaintiff, Bracken, filed a workers' compensation claim
in a timely fashion but in an improper venue. 20 3 Bracken moved for a
change of venue, but the court dismissed the case without prejudice for
lack of venue. 204 In the meantime, the statute of limitations ran on
Bracken's cause of action.20 1 The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal
on the grounds of improper venue and the trial court's lack of power
to transfer the case to a proper venue. 206 Bracken appealed to the supreme
court. 20 7 On appeal, the supreme court addressed the issue of whether the
filing of a complaint in an improper venue tolls the statute of limitations32
The court held that because Bracken had satisfied the Workers' Compensation Act statute of limitations by diligently filing his original complaint, the statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of the
original action and the subsequent appeal. °9
The court noted that the 'general' rule [followed by New Mexico]
that, in the absence of statute, filing of an action in an improper venue
does not toll the statute of limitations" is infrequently applied in federal
and other state courts 210 and is countered by other jurisdictions that do
toll the statute of limitations in similar situations. 21 The court noted that
the general policy of Congress and the states has been to prevent barring

exception in the tolling statute in United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Aeronautics, Inc., 107 N.M. 320,
757 P.2d 790 (1988). The court stated that the tolling statute tolls the statute of limitations "except
when the dismissal was based on the plaintiff's failure to pursue his claim." Id. at 322, 757 P.2d
at 792.
199. Bracken v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 107 N.M. 463, 760 P.2d 155 (1988).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 466, 760 P.2d at 158.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 463, 760 P.2d at 155.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 466, 760 P.2d at 158.
211. Id. (citing Brown v. Owens, 674 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. 1984) (the filing of an action in an
improper venue tolls that statute of limitations); Colin v. State Dep't of Transp., 423 So. 2d 1020
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Florida tolls the statute of limitations when the action is filed in an
improper venue but treats the filing of the second action in the proper venue after its dismissal for
improper venue as an amended complaint.)).
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timely actions when those actions are originally brought in an improper
venue. 21 2 The purpose driving such procedural flexibility is to remove
"justice defeating technicalities" which prevent adjudication of cases on
their merits.1 3 In such cases, "the filing itself shows the proper diligence
the plaintiff which such statutes of limitation were intended
on the part of
4
to insure.''

2

Although Bracken involved the tolling of the statute of limitations in
a workers' compensation matter, the decision can be read as extending
the court's flexible view of statutes of limitation to encompass other types
2 5
of claims. In Bracken, the court explicitly overruled Estate of Gutierrez.'
In Estate of Gutierrez, the plaintiff was barred from refiling its claim in
state court after the statute of limitations had run while the same action
21 6 The fact that the
was in federal court on a pendent jurisdiction claim.
Bracken court specifically overruled Gutierrez suggests that a timely-filed
action will toll the statute of limitations during the time a federal court
has pendent jurisdiction." 7
Bracken thus enunciates a new rule which operates to toll the statute
of limitations for cases dismissed for improper venue or dismissed by a
federal court's refusal to entertain pendent jurisdiction. The rule certainly
applies to workers' compensation and Tort Claims Act claims, and it
probably extends to all cases. The court stated unequivocally in Bracken
that it was enunciating a rule "that the filing of a complaint in an
21 8
improper venue tolls the statute of limitations. ' Therefore, the Bracken
decision extends to all cases that are dismissed for improper venue.
212. Id. at 465, 760 P.2d at 157 (citing Burnett v. New York Central R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424
(1965)).
213. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962). In Burnett, a federal FELA case, the United
States Supreme Court stated that the general policy of preventing the barring of timely actions is
further buttressed in a workers' compensation action in view of the humanitarian purpose of workers'
compensation legislation. 380 U.S. at 434-35.
214. Bracken, 107 N.M. at 465, 760 P.2d at 157 (quoting Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 467). The court
also addressed, but did not resolve, the authority of a trial court to transfer an improperly filed
case intrastate to the proper venue. Such a procedure would achieve the same result as the equitable
tolling doctrine enunciated in Bracken. The court questioned whether the current judicial distinction
between proper and improper venue for the purpose of allowing nonstatutory authority to transfer
is meaningful. Id. at 464, 760 P.2d at 156 (citing Jones v. New Mexico State Highway Dep't, 92
N.M. 671, 593 P.2d 1074 (1979); State ex rel. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Frost, 102 N.M.
369, 695 P.2d 1318 (1985)). Judge Walters wrote a specially concurring opinion stating that the trial
court should be able to "exercise its equitable power to transfer venue when the interest of justice
will be served in doing so." Id. at 466, 760 P.2d at 158.
215. Id. at 466, 760 P.2d at 158; see Estate of Gutierrez v. Albuquerque Police Dep't, 104 N.M
I1, 717 P.2d 87 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 103 N.M. 798, 715 P.2d 711 (1986), overruled on other
grounds sub nom. Bracken v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 107 N.M. 463, 768 P.2d 155 (1988).
216. Estate of Gutierrez, 104 N.M. at 117, 717 P.2d at 93.
217. A New Mexico federal district court thought that the Bracken decision was not clear on
whether the New Mexico Supreme Court would toll the statute of limitations period during the
pendency of a plaintiff's suit in federal court. Thus, the federal court refused to dismiss the pendent
state claim until it had received written notice from the defendants waiving their statute of limitations
defense. Dimas v. County of Quay, 730 F. Supp. 373 (D.N.M. 1990). However, in dicta in GathmanMatotan Architects & Planners, Inc. v. New Mexico, the supreme court interpreted the Bracken
decision as "clearly" applying to cases dismissed for improper venue as well as by a "federal court's
discretionary refusal to entertain pendent jurisdiction." 109 N.M. 492, 494, 787 P.2d 411, 413 (1990).
218. Bracken, 107 N.M. at 463, 760 P.2d at 155.
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The plaintiff in Gathman tried to invoke the nonstatutory or equitable
tolling theory enunciated in Bracken as a means to suspend the operation
of the statute of limitations in its case. The court acknowledged that New
Mexico had adopted an equitable tolling doctrine and recognized "the
general principle that the filing of a complaint ordinarily tolls the applicable
limitations period.

' 21 9

However, the court was firm in stating that an

equitable tolling doctrine is subject to the same constraints as a statutory
tolling situation. 220 Therefore, when an action is dismissed for failure to
prosecute or negligence in prosecution, the statute of limitations will not
be tolled by statute or in equity. 22' The court was adamant that the tolling
rule enunciated in Bracken is inapplicable to cases dismissed because of
a failure to prosecute. 222 The limitation on the applicability of the Bracken

tolling rule is probably grounded in public policy and the interest of
justice. If a plaintiff has acted in good faith by filing a timely action
but, absent a rule to toll the statute, would be prevented from asserting
its claims based on a mere technicality, the tolling rule applies. However,
if an action is dismissed for failure to prosecute, as in Gathman, the
plaintiff has slept on his rights and there is no equitable reason to allow
him an extended time to sue. Therefore, the limitation period will not
be interrupted.
In Eturriaga v. Valdez, 223 the supreme court was presented with a direct
conflict between the New Mexico Election Code and New Mexico Rule
of Civil Procedure 1-087(B) regarding the time allowed to contest an
election result. The court had to decide whether the legislature or the
court had the power to adopt procedural rules for contesting election
225
results. 224 In the 1976 case of Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting,

New Mexico adopted a rigid concept of separation of power. In Ammerman, the court held that there was a clear distinction between judicial
power and legislative power, with procedural matters vested exclusively
in the courts and substantive matters vested exclusively in the legislature . 226
The Ammerman doctrine of exclusivity has been widely criticized as
unrealistically inflexible given the difficulty in categorizing a particular
matter as substantive or procedural. 227 Also, the doctrine of exclusivity

219. Gathman, 109 N.M. at 495, 787 P.2d at 414 (citing Prieto v. Home Educ. Livelihood Program,
94 N.M. 738, 616 P.2d 1123 (Ct. App. 1980)).

220. Id.
221. Id. The court stated:
A plaintiff who files near the end of the limitations period benefits from being able
to prosecute his claim after the period has expired, but if he fails to take advantage
of the opportunity, and suffers dismissal for failure to prosecute, there is no reason
to let him have an extended period in which to sue.
Id. (quoting King v. Lujan, 98 N.M. 179, 181, 646 P.2d 1243, 1245 (1982)).
222. Id.
223. 109 N.M. 205, 784 P.2d 24 (1989).
224. Id. at 206, 784 P.2d at 25.

225. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
226. Id.at 311, 551 P.2d at 1358.
227. For a discussion of this difficulty, see Southwest Community Health Servs. v. Smith, 107
N.M.

196, 755 P.2d 40 (1988) (Scarborough, J., dissenting); Maples v. State, 110 N.M. 34, 791
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prescribed by the Ammerman decision fails to take into account the
existence of the long-recognized legislative power to establish procedural
mechanisms for special statutory proceedings. 22 The legislature is empowered "to establish new rights and responsibilities [not known at common law] between a government and its people" and has the "necessary
power to determine the procedural mechanism for the resolution of disputes
with respect to those rights and responsibilities." 229 If the legislative procedure differs from the judicial rules, the legislative* procedure must be
followed. 230 "If the legislature expressly incorporates the district court
rules as the procedure to be followed in the statutory proceeding, or does
not provide a conflicting procedure, then the existing court rules apply." 23 '
The Ammerman decision can be read to imply that a rigid adherence to
the doctrine of separation of powers comes into play only when a conflict
develops between the application of a statute and a rule.23 2 The otherwise
dogmatic rule of exclusivity espoused in the Ammerman decision can thus
be read to be tempered by "undertones of shared responsibility for rule-

making with the judiciary. "233

Under the election code, a contestant must commence an action to
contest an election result by filing a verified complaint within thirty days
23 4
of the issuance of a certificate of nomination or a certificate of election.
Under rule 1-087(B), the contestant was directed to file a notice of contest
235
within fifteen days of the issuance of a certificate of nomination.
Jose Eturriaga and Jacobo "Jake" Salazar lost to Cicilia Valdez and
Joe B. Romero in the primary for the office of County Commissioner
in Rio Arriba County. 236 Pursuant to the election code, Eturriaga and
Salazar filed a verified complaint with the district court within thirty days
237
following the issuance of certificates of nomination to Valdez and Romero.
Valdez and Romero successfully filed a motion to dismiss for, among
other things, Eturriaga's and Salazar's failure to file timely notices of
contest within fifteen days of the issuance of certificates of nomination
as provided for in rule 1-087(B). 238 Eturriaga and Salazar appealed and

P.2d 788 (1990) (Montgomery, J., dissenting); see also Browde & Occhialino, Separation of Powers
and the Judicial Rule-Making Power inNew Mexico: The Need for Prudential Constraints, 15 N.M.L.
REv. 407, 443-47 (1985).
228. Browde & Occhialino, supra note 227, at 408-09 n.4.

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. "Ammerman thus may be read as decreeing that only legislative enactments concerning
procedure are valid until the supreme court has exercised its inherent and superseding power to revoke
or amend the statutory provision." Id. at 443.
233. Id.
234. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
235. The court found that there is no practical difference between a "verified complaint" and a
"notice of contest." Eturriaga, 109 N.M. at 209, 784 P.2d at 28. "Thus, Rule 1-087 may be read
to substitute the words 'verified complaint of contest' where 'notice of contest' now appears." Id.
236. Id. at 207, 784 P.2d at 26.
237. Id. at 206, 784 P.2d at 25.
238. Id. at 207, 784 P.2d at 26.
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contended that rule 1-087 was inapplicable.23 9 The issue went directly to
the supreme court, which held that the time limit in the election code
was part of the substantive right to contest election results
granted by
24°
the legislature and consequently rule 1-087(B) was invalid.
In reaching its decision, the supreme court held that the thirty-day time
24

limit was a limitation of the substantive right to contest election results. '

The statute which created the right to contest elections also limited that
right. As such, the limitation defined the substantive right, and the court's
procedural power did not include invalidating "substantive policy choices
made by the legislature." 242 Therefore, rule 1-087 directly conflicted with

a substantive legislative choice and was invalid. 243 The court noted, however, that where rule 1-087 does not conflict with a statute, it remains
effective.24

Eturriaga evinces a continuing inclination of the supreme court to
recognize the shared responsibility for rulemaking between the judiciary
and the legislature and a softening of the Ammerman holding. 245 The
election code created a special statutory proceeding to contest election
results. Although the legislature incorporated the district court rules of
procedure in the election code, when faced with a conflict between supreme
court procedural rule 1-087(B) and section 1-14-3 of the New Mexico
Statutes, the court invalidated its own rule rather than the election code

239. Id. at 209, 784 P.2d at 28.
240. Id. at 210, 784 P.2d at 29.
241. Id. The supreme court reviewed the statutory development of the election code. In 1943, the
legislature created the substantive right to contest an election result. In 1971, the code was revised.
Many of the provisions regulating practice and procedure were repealed and the code provided that
the rules of civil procedure should apply to all election contests. The code did not, however, repeal
the provision providing for the initiation of a contest proceeding within thirty days of the issuance
of the certificate of nomination or election. Id. at 208-09, 784 P.2d at 27-28.
242. Id. at 209, 784 P.2d at 28.
243. Id. at 210, 784 P.2d at 29.
244. Id.
245. Decisions subsequent to Ammerman appear to be softening the strict exclusivity doctrine and
developing the concept of shared responsibility for rulemaking between the branches of government.
For example, in State ex rel. Gesswein v. Galvan, 100 N.M. 769, 676 P.2d 1334 (1984), the supreme
court was confronted with a conflict between a statute and a judicial rule regarding peremptory
challenges. In its decision, the court did not invalidate the procedural aspects of the statute under
the auspices of separation of powers. Id. Rather, it held that the procedural aspects of the statute
were preempted when confronted by a court rule. Id. at 772, 676 P.2d at 1337. The court noted
that the judicial system was swamped with peremptory challenges and contemporaneously with its
decision issued a stricter rule which required an affidavit proving sufficient facts to show bias or
prejudice. Id. at 773, 676 P.2d at 1338. The decision and new rule resulted in a modification of
the statute. Id. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the new rule and resulting modification of the
statute was necessary because of the judicial problems caused by the procedural aspect of the statute.
Id.
A further development of the concept of shared procedural power and the acknowledged difficulty
in ascertaining what is procedural and what is substantive was evidenced in Southwest Community
Health Servs. v. Smith, 107 N.M. 196, 755 P.2d 40 (1988). The court held that the confidentiality
provision of the Review Organization Immunity Act does not conflict with the court's evidentiary
rules, which were deemed procedural in Ammerman. Id. at 199, 755 P.2d at 43. The court found
that the immunity from discovery granted by the legislature in the review process for doctors is a
substantive right. Id. The court focused on the "essential" powers of the legislature and judiciary
and implied that there is bound to be some overlapping of substantive and procedural powers beyond
the spheres of what is deemed essential. Id. at 200, 755 P.2d at 44.
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on the ground that the election code procedures represent a substantive
right created by the legislature.
In 1989, the court considered another time limitation conflict involving
the relationship between two supreme court rules and a district court rule.
In Archuleta v. New Mexico State Police,24 the court interpreted the
interplay between New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure 1-060(B) and 1059 and rule 12-201 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.2 47
A motion for a new trial can be made pursuant to two rules: (1) rule
1-059 (the district court rule), which requires that motions for a new trial
be made within ten days of the judgment and also provides for a thirtyday limit for a ruling by the trial court; 24 or (2) rule 1-060(B), which,
although more limited in scope than rule 1-059, allows motions to be
made within either one year or a reasonable time, depending upon the
reason for the motion. 249 Rule 1-060(B) does not250 provide a time limit
within which the court must rule on the motion.
In Archuleta v. New Mexico State Police, Archuleta filed a motion for
a new trial under rule 1-059 after a jury found for the defendant, New
Mexico State Police. 25' Archuleta sought relief from the judgment because
of improper influence on a juror. 2 2 The district court ruled on the motion
two months later and ordered a new trial. 253 The New Mexico State Police

appealed .254
The court of appeals addressed the procedural implications of the timing
of the district court's order. The court held that Archuleta's motion for
a new trial could have been brought under rule 1-060(B) because of the
allegation of a tainted jury. 255 Then, the court, sua sponte, treated the
motion as if it had been made pursuant to rule 1-060(B) rather than
pursuant to rule 1-059, the district court rule. 25 6 The court held that the
thirty-day time limit of rule 1-059 did not apply to motions for a new
trial authorized by rule 1-060(B). 217 The court reached this decision by
25
employing the reasoning that it used in an earlier case, Wooley v. Wicker.
In Wooley v. Wicker, the court considered the relationship between
rule 1-060(B) and section 39-1-1 of the New Mexico Statutes and interpreted
section 39-1-1 so as not to apply to rule 1-060(B) motions for a new

246. 108 N.M. 543, 775 P.2d 745 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 384, 772 P.2d 1307 (1989).
247. Id. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-060(B) subjects post-trial motions to a specific time limit for the trial
court's ruling. Rules 12-201 and 1-059 provide for a 30-day time limit within which post-trial motions
must be decided by the trial court or be deemed denied. Id. 1-059; N.M. R. App. P. 12-201.
248. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-059.
249. Id. 1-060.
250. Id.
251. 108 N.M. at 543, 775 P.2d at 745.
252. Id. at 544, 775 P.2d at 746.
253. Id. at 545, 775 P.2d at 747.
254. Id. at 544, 775 P.2d at 746.
255. Id. at 545, 775 P.2d at 747.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 546, 775 P.2d at 748.
258. Id. (citing Wooley v. Wicker, 75 N.M. 241, 403 P.2d 685 (1965)).
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trial.25 9 Section 39-1-1 provides that a trial court retains control of a final
judgment for thirty days after entry of judgment, or for such time as is
necessary to rule on any motion filed within thirty days of the final
judgment.2w6 However, the court must rule on motions filed within the
thirty-day time limit within thirty days of the filing of the motion, otherwise
the motion is deemed denied. 26' The Wooley court held that post-trial
motions made pursuant to rule 1-060(B) are not governed by the time
limit set by section 39-1-1 .262 The Wooley court reasoned that the application of the statutory time limit for ruling was limited to motions that
must be made within the statutory period of thirty days. 263 Rule 1-060(B)
motions can be made within a reasonable time, and a reasonable time
may exceed 30 days. Furthermore, section 39-1-1 expressly excludes apCode 1915,
plication of the statute to provisions of sections 4227 or 4230,
2
which sections are now incorporated into rule 1-060(B). 6
The Archuleta court applied similar reasoning to that in Wooley to its
analysis of the interplay between rules 1-060(B) and 1-059.265 Because rule
1-059 motions must be made within thirty days of judgment, rule 1-059
and its time limit for ruling cannot apply to rule 1-060(B), which allows
some motions to be made within a "reasonable time."'' To rule otherwise
would impose a time limit for judgments and motions for a new trial
after which a rule 1-060(B) motion could still be properly filed .267 Furthermore, rule 1-060(B) motions for a new trial (as opposed to rule 1059 motions, which generally require that the court reconsider matters
that occurred during the trial) can involve matters not previously before
the court and may well require additional time to ascertain.
The court also addressed whether the time limit for ruling imposed by
rule 12-201,26s the appellate rule, applies to rule 1-060(B) motions. 269 The
court decided that the appellate rule does not apply to rule 1-060(B)
motions for two reasons. First, the appellate rule time limit for ruling
on post-trial motions is of limited scope given the context in which it is
found. 270 Specifically, the time limit exists only in the section of the
appellate rule entitled "Extension of Time."127' The time limit thus does
not "apply to motions that might be filed after the time for appeal ha[s]

259. Wooley, 75 N.M. at 245, 403 P.2d at 688.
260. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-1-1 (Supp. 1990).
261. Id.
262. Wooley, 75 N.M. at 245, 403 P.2d at 688.

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Archuleta, 108 N.M. at 547, 775 P.2d at 749.

266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Rule 12-201 governs appeals as of right from the district court and when they are to be
made. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the filing of the judgment or order.
N.M. R. App. P. 12-201(A). Upon a showing of good cause, the district court may extend the time
for filing the notice. Id. 12-201(E). If a post-trail motion for a new trial attacking the judgment is
not granted within 30 days from when it was filed, it will be deemed denied. Id. 12-201(E)(5).
269. Archuleta, 108 N.M. at 547, 775 P.2d at 749.
270. Id.
271. Id. (citing N.M. R. App. P. 12-201(E)(5)).
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expired or after an appeal ha[s] been decided. ' 272 Second, freeing rule 1060(B) motions from the time limits of the appellate rules does not create
post-trial delays prior to appeal because a rule 1-060(B) motion does not
affect the finality of a judgment, and thus affects neither the time for
filing an appeal nor the appellate court's disposition of an appeal.273
V.

DISCOVERY

In the area of discovery, New Mexico's appellate courts handed down
decisions concerning medical record and work product/attorney-client immunities during the survey period. The issue of sanctions was also addressed.
A.

Immunities

1. Medical Records
In Southwest Community Health Services v. Smith,274 the petitioner,
Southwest, brought a prohibition proceeding after a trial court ordered
the production of medical peer review records in a medical malpractice
action. The supreme court was faced with the issue of whether the Review
Organization Immunity Act ("Act")"'7 conflicted with existing judicial
evidentiary rules. 276 The Act provides immunity for certain data and
information, whereas the supreme court's rules deny such a privilege unless
277
otherwise provided for by the constitution or other supreme court rules.
In the past, the supreme court has held that legislation creating a testimonial
278
privilege in a judicial proceeding is unconstitutional.
Steve and Tammy Greeson brought medical malpractice actions against
Southwest and Dr. Robert Gathings. 279 In motions to compel answers to
interrogatories and production of documents, the Greesons sought the
credentialing file that Southwest maintained on Dr. Gathings. 280 In response, Southwest argued that the information was immune from discovery
under section 41-9-5 of the Act. s After an in camera review, the trial

272. Id.
273. Id.
274. 107 N.M. 196, 755 P.2d 40 (1988).
275. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-9-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
276. Southwest, 107 N.M. at 197, 755 P.2d at 41. The court was unable to decide the issue of
whether the trial court was correct in finding that the statute is not applicable to a credentials file.

Id.
277. The supreme court rules provide privileged immunity for attorney-client relationships, as well
as psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, and priest-penitent relationships. N.M. R. EvlD. 11-503 to

-506.
278. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976), appealed on other
grounds after remand, 91 N.M. 250, 572 P.2d 1258 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 249, 572 P.2d
1258 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
279. Southwest, 107 N.M. at 197, 755 P.2d at 41.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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court ordered Southwest to produce the requested documents. 212 Southwest
petitioned the supreme court for an alternative writ of prohibition or
superintending control to prevent the disclosure.3 After a hearing, the
supreme court issued a preliminary writ and instructed the parties to
address the constitutionality of section 41-9-5.24
The supreme court has previously held legislation creating a testimonial
privilege in a judicial proceeding to be unconstitutional. 25 The court relied
on Marbury v. Madison2 6 for the principle that it is the unique responsibility of the courts, not the legislature, to resolve a conflict between
two competing constitutional interests. 2 7 Although the judiciary has shared
procedural rulemaking with the legislature, any conflict between court
rules and statutes that relate to procedure are resolved in favor of the
court's rules. 2 s
In Southwest, the supreme court held that all data and information
acquired by a review organization in the exercise of its duties and functions,
and opinions formed as a result of the review organization's hearings,
are governed by section 41-9-5 of the Act. 2 9 However, when a party
invokes section 41-9-5 in order to immunize evidence from discovery, the
burden rests on that party to prove that the data or information was
generated exclusively for peer review and for no other purpose. 29° The
were formed
party invoking the section must also show that opinions
29
exclusively as a result of peer review deliberations. '
The court further held that a party seeking access to confidential
information must satisfy the trial court that the information constitutes
evidence which is critical to his cause of action or defense. 292 The court
quashed the alternative writ and remanded the case for the trial court to
293
determine whether section 41-9-5 was applicable to the credentialing file.
If section 41-9-5 was applicable, the trial court would proceed with

Id.
Id.
Id.
Ammerman, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354.
5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
Southwest, 107 N.M. at 200, 755 P.2d at 44.
Maestas v. Allen, 97 N.M. 230, 638 P.2d 1075 (1982).
Southwest, 107 N.M. at 200, 755 P.2d at 44.
Id.
Id.
If the evidence was neither generated nor formed exclusively for or as a result of
peer review, it shall not be immune from discovery unless it is shown to be otherwise
available by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Of course, under SCRA 1986, 1026(B)(1) and 1-037(A), the party seeking to compel discovery would have had the
initial burden of proving relevance to the subject matter. The procedure will entail
the trial court's in camera examination of the information and, perhaps, an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether it properly falls within the parameters of Section 419-5 as announced by the court today.
Id. (emphasis in original).
292. Id. at 200-01, 775 P.2d at 44-45. Failure of the litigant's cause of action or defense will turn
on evidence determined to fall within section 49-9-5. The court shall compel production of such
evidence.
293. Id. at 201, 775 P.2d at 45.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
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balancing the need to ensure the confidentiality of peer review documentation against the litigants' need to discover evidence essential to the
merits of their case. 294
As a result of Southwest, a party who invokes section 41-9-5 in order
to immunize evidence from discovery has the burden to prove that the
data or information was generated exclusively for peer review and for
no other purpose. 295 A party seeking access to confidential information
must satisfy the trial court that the information constitutes evidence which
is critical to his cause of action or defense.2
2. Work-Product/Attorney-Client
In Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,297 the New Mexico Supreme
Court faced an issue of first impression in New Mexico. The issue was
whether a party waived the attorney-client privilege and work-product
immunity of allegedly protected documents by inadvertently producing
them to opposing counsel. 29 Some courts in other jurisdictions use a caseby-case determination of waiver based on a consideration of the circumstances. 29 Other courts determine whether a privilege is lost based on
certain criteria) °°
In Hartman, El Paso Natural Gas Company ("El Paso") argued that
it had inadvertently produced two allegedly privileged documents prior to
the court's order of production of the documents.3 0' El Paso relied on
analogies to contract law, asserting the equitable defense of mistake of
fact. 0 2 Additionally, El Paso relied on Mendenhall v. Barber-GreeneCo.30 3
for the holding that an attorney's inadvertent production of privileged
letters to its adversary in a patent infringement action does not constitute
a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
The trial court ruled that El Paso waived the attorney-client privilege
and work-product immunity of the documents by inadvertently producing
the documents to the opposition. 4 On appeal, the supreme court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering El Paso to
produce the documents. 05 The supreme court quoted the principle stated

294. Id.

295. Id. at 200, 775 P.2d at 44.
296. Id. at 201, 775 P.2d at 45.
297. 107 N.M. 679, 763 P.2d 1144 (1988).

298. Id. at 686-87, 763 P.2d at 1151-52.
299. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
300. Parkway Gallery v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 50 (M.D.N.C.
1987) (five factors/criteria listed by court were: (1) the reasonableness of the precaution taken to
prevent inadvertent disclosure in view of the extent of the document production; (2) the number of
inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the disclosures; (4) any delay and measures taken to rectify
the disclosures; (5) and whether the overriding interests of justice would be served by relieving a
party of its error).
301. Hartman, 107 N.M. at 687, 763 P.2d at 1152.
302. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 654 P.2d 548
(1982); Talley v. Security Serv. Corp., 99 N.M. 702, 663 P.2d 361 (1983).
303. 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
304. Hartman, 107 N.M. at 681, 763 P.2d at 1146.
305. Id. at 687, 763 P.2d at 1152.
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by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: "It is
axiomatic that the burden is on a party claiming the protection of a
privilege to establish those facts that are the essential elements of the
privileged relationship. "3 06 The supreme court disagreed with El Paso's
7
contention that Mendenhall should be the rule in New Mexico. 0 Instead,
the court favored the approach taken by the court in Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. Garvey. a01 In Hartford Fire Insurance Co., a California
court adopted a case-by-case determination of waiver based on a consideration of all of the circumstances. The Hartford court regarded a "case
by case determination" as the modern trend and a majority rule."°
After accepting Hartford as the modern trend, the supreme court listed
five factors that it will use to determine whether a document has lost its
privilege:
(1) The reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent
disclosure in view of the extent of the document production; (2) the
number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the disclosures;
(4) any delay and measures taken to rectify the disclosures; (5) and
whether the overriding interests of justice would be served by relieving
a party of its error.310
The court measured El Paso's conduct by these standards and found that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered El Paso to
produce the documents. 31 The supreme court decided that the criteria
listed above pertains to a trial court's determination of attorney-client
privilege, as well as work-product immunity issues.112 As for additional
documents, the court decided "since the cat was already out of the bag"
with the two inadvertently produced documents, it was not prejudicial to
El Paso's case for the trial court to order production of the additional
documents.3"'
Sanctions
In two companion cases, the court of appeals significantly developed
and refined a court's use of discovery sanctions. While reminding practitioners that discovery sanctions are normally remedial rather than punitive, the court nevertheless expanded the immediate use of harsh discovery
sanctions against parties who conduct discovery in bad faith.
In the first case, Sandoval v. Martinez,34 the court of appeals affirmed
a district court's dismissal with prejudice of a plaintiff's complaint because
B.

306. Id. (quoting von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2nd Cir.), cert denied, 481 U.S.
1015 (1987)).
307. Id.
308. 109 F.R.D. 323 (N.D. Cal. 1985).

309. Id.
310. Hartman, 107 N.M. at 687, 763 P.2d at 1152 (quoting Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v.
Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 50 (M.D.N.C. 1987)).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 689, 763 P.2d at 1154.
314. 109 N.M. 5, 780 P.2d 1152 (Ct. App. 1989).
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the plaintiff lied in answers to interrogatories. The court further held that
an evidentiary hearing prior to the dismissal was not necessary in this
case and, because the issue of the hearing was not preserved for appeal,
315
it could not be raised on appeal.
Plaintiff Sandoval sued defendants Martinez and Sena for personal
injuries suffered in an automobile accident.31 6 Martinez and Sena subsequently served Sandoval with interrogatories and a request for production.3" 7 Sandoval served answers to the interrogatories three weeks late
and produced the documents only after Martinez and Sena filed a motion
to compel production.3 m
" Three of the interrogatories inquired whether
Sandoval had been in any prior auto accidents, had suffered any injuries
in any prior accidents, or had undergone any surgical procedures prior
to the accident.31 9 Sandoval responded to each of these inquires with an
"N/A.1 320 Further, during her deposition, Sandoval denied having received
any traffic citations in the past five years.3 2'
At her deposition, Sandoval agreed to supply Martinez and Sena with
an authorization to obtain her medical records.22 Upon receipt of these
records, Martinez and Sena discovered that Sandoval had in fact suffered
injuries in two previous automobile accidents, one of which required
surgery.3 23 Martinez and Sena also discovered that Sandoval had received
two speeding tickets in the past five years. 24 Based on these discoveries,
Martinez and Sena moved for sanctions against Sandoval for discovery
abuses.3 25 Pursuant to rules 1-011 and 1-037 of the New Mexico Rules
of Civil Procedure, the district court dismissed Sandoval's complaint with
prejudice for her bad faith failure to meet discovery obligations by providing false answers to interrogatories. 326 Sandoval appealed.3 27
Affirming the district court's dismissal, the court of appeals relied strictly
on rule 1-037(D), which authorizes the sanction of dismissal even if the
sanctioned party has not violated a court order. 328 The court acknowledged

315. Id. at 12, 780 P.2d at 1159.
316. Id.at 6, 780 P.2d at 1153.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 7, 780 P.2d at 1154. Moreover, the injuries which plaintiff was seeking damages for
in the instant action involved injuries to the same areas of her body as those received in the two
previous accidents. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 6, 780 P.2d at 1153.
328. Id. at 7, 780 P.2d at 1154. Rule 1-037 provides in part:
D. If a party ... fails[:]
(2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 1-033,
after proper service of the interrogatories; or
(3) [to respond to a production request pursuant to Rule 1-034], the court in
which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the
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that when read literally, rule 1-037(D) appears to provide for sanctions
in the absence of a violation of a court order only if a party fails to
serve answers or objections to interrogatories; i.e., the "complete absence
of any interrogatory answer." 3 29 However, the court went on to state that
''an answer [to discovery requests] can be so useless as to be equivalent
to no answer. ' 330 In fact, the court reasoned that a false answer is actually
worse than no answer because it is a much greater obstruction to the
discovery process.33 ' Specifically, the court reasoned that when the party
serving the interrogatory receives no answer, it can then move for an
order to compel compliance with discovery.33 2 When the serving party
333
receives a false response, however, it may never learn of the falsehood.
The court then turned to the question of whether dismissal was an
appropriate remedy given the circumstances in this case.3 34 The court
initially recognized that the discovery rules provide a "hierarchy of sanctions" and that remedial relief is the customary sanction initially used in
discovery violations.33 When a party demonstrates a "clear showing of
willfulness or bad faith," however, it is imperative "that severe sanctions
be imposed to preserve the integrity of the judicial process and the due
process rights of the other litigants. 33 6 The court went on to state that
in such cases, the "[dlistrict courts have a duty to enforce compliance
they should not shirk from imposition of
with rules of discovery, and
337
dismissal.
of
sanction
the
33
Sandoval presented an issue of first impression in New Mexico. While
9 indicated that a
33
dicta in United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co.
court could impose sanctions for false discovery responses, it did not
consider whether default or dismissal were appropriate sanctions for false
discovery responses. 34 The Sandoval court justified its liberal interpretation

failure as are just, and among others, it may take any action authorized under
Subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Subparagraph (2) of Paragraph B of this rule
[including the sanction of dismissal].
N.M. R. Ctv. P. 1-037.
329. Sandoval, 109 N.M. at 8, 780 P.2d at 1155.
330. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on holdings from several other jurisdictions
that rule 1-037(D) is appropriate to use to sanction a party when a discovery response is tantamount
to no response. Id.; see, e.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Eco Chemical, Inc., 757 F.2d 1256
1987), aff'd, 839 F.2d
(Fed. Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 114 F.R.D. 615 (N.D. Ill.
1982); Bell v.
302 (7th Cir. 1988); Fautek v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 96 F.R.D. 141 (N.D. Ill.
Automobile Club of Michigan, 80 F.R.D. 228 (E.D. Mich. 1978), appeal dismissed, 601 1F.2d 587
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 918 (1979); Airtex Corp. v. Shelley Radiant Ceiling Co., 536 F.2d
145 (7th Cir. 1976).
331. Sandoval, 109 N.M. at 8-9, 780 P.2d at 1155-56.
332. Id. at 8, 780 P.2d at 1155.
333. Id. at 9, 780 P.2d at 1156.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. (quoting United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 241, 629 P.2d 231,
317 (1980), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981)).
337. Id. (emphasis in original).
338. Id. at 7, 780 P.2d at 1154.
339. 96 N.M. 155, 208, 629 P.2d 231, 284 (1980).
340. Sandoval, 109 N.M. at 7, 780 P.2d at 1154.
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of rule 1-037(D) with policy reasons. First, in justifying the holding that
some discovery responses are tantamount to no response, the court stated
that rule 1-037(D) would become virtually meaningless if a party could
merely respond to interrogatories by writing a letter refusing to comply
with discovery, with no fear of sanction other than a court order directing
compliance. 3 4' Next, the court justified the use of harsh sanctions as a
first measure for bad faith discovery proceedings by pointing out that
when a party lies in discovery, it not only seeks to conceal discoverable
information, but also expects to evade sanctions. 42 If faced with the harsh
sanction of dismissal, however, a party might be deterred from lying
because the "risk of punishment outweighs the prospect of competitive
advantage through lying. 3 43 Further, because a district court "cannot be
sure that all lies have been detected," the court can properly conclude
that no "intermediate" sanctions would be effective.344
The fact that the plaintiff lied during the discovery process was obviously
troubling to the court of appeals. The court pointed out that there were
two critical aspects of the falsehoods on which they focused. First, Sandoval's false answers "were not direct assertions of material elements of
a claim or defense. '3 45 Second, the answers "deceive[d] defendants about
the existence of discoverable information that could be critical to preparation for trial. '31 46 By way of explanation, the court pointed out that
because the discoverable information did not go to an element of the
claims or defenses in this case, it would not likely arise during the factfinding phase of the trial.3 47 Further, the defendants could not meaningfully
prepare for trial because they were denied a "legitimate avenue of investigation into matters that were relevant, [and perhaps] dispositive on
the questions of causation and damages. 3 48 It is unclear, therefore, if
the court will endorse the use of such harsh sanctions as a first measure
if the "lying" party in no way prejudices its opponent.
Although the holding in Sandoval significantly expands the district
courts' use of harsh discovery sanctions and provides another weapon for
litigators to use in forcing adverse parties to comply with discovery requests,
the court recognized the potential for the abuse of this new weapon and
attempted to provide some safeguards and guidelines to ensure its proper
use. First, the court suggested that when an appellate court reviews a
default sanction, its review should be "particularly scrupulous" to ensure
that the default sanction is not used carelessly by the trial court.149 Second,
the court pointed out that although the trial court now has a duty to
341. Id.at 8, 780 P.2d at 1155.
342. Id. at 11, 780 P.2d at 1158.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
279).

Id.
Id.at 12, 780 P.2d at 1159.
Id.at I1,780 P.2d at 1158.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9, 780 P.2d at 1156 (quoting United Nuclear Corp., 96 N.M. at 203, 629 P.2d at
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order dismissal for misconduct, it must still "guard against a degeneration
35 0
of litigation into the pursuit of a dismissal or default."
Finally, the court noted that although an evidentiary hearing is normally
conducted before the sanction of dismissal is imposed, in this case Sandoval
did not seek a hearing, even in her reconsideration motion after the
dismissal order.35 ' Further, the court of appeals could not discern any
fundamental violation of Sandoval's rights as a result of the lack of the
hearing.35 2 Because Sandoval did not preserve the issue for appeal, she
353
was barred from raising the hearing issue on appeal.
The lesson from Sandoval is that New Mexico courts will not tolerate
flagrant bad faith abuse of the discovery process, particularly when such
abuse prejudices the rights of other litigants in the case. While instructing
district courts to ensure that the parties do not turn every litigation into
a "race" for dismissal or default at the first sign of discovery noncompliance, the court has notified practitioners that discovery must be
pursued in good faith. Otherwise, harsh sanctions, although the exception,
will be imposed by district courts as a first measure of relief.
3 54
In New Mexico v. One 1978 Buick LeSabre, the New Mexico Court
of Appeals added some clarity to the "failure to respond" standard
announced in Sandoval.355 The court of appeals also reminded practitioners
that immediate harsh sanctions are still the exception and are saved for
particularly egregious discovery abuses, such as those in Sandoval. In One
1978 Buick LeSabre, the court of appeals reversed a default judgment
entered by the trial court against a defendant who allegedly violated
discovery rules. a56 The court stated that in the absence of a court order
compelling discovery and the defendant's subsequent violation of that
57
order, a default judgment was improper in this case.
The State of New Mexico sought a default judgment against George
Kinshaw ("Kinshaw") in a suit by the state to forfeit an automobile and
cash which Kinshaw allegedly used in a conspiracy to distribute marijuana. 5 The state sought the default based on "Kinshaw's allegedly
improper invocation of ... the privilege against self incrimination in
response to interrogatories and a request for production served upon him
[by the state]." 35 9 Kinshaw invoked the privilege based on the fact that
36° The
he faced pending criminal charges relating to the car and cash.
state filed a motion asking the court to compel discovery and sanction
36
Kinshaw; however, the court never entered an order compelling discovery. '

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

Id. at 10, 780 P.2d at 1157.
Id. at 12, 780 P.2d at 1159.
Id.at 13, 780 P.2d at 1160.
Id.
108 N.M. 612, 775 P.2d 1329 (Ct. App. 1989).
Sandoval v. Martinez, 109 N.M. 5, 780 P.2d 1152 (Ct. App. 1989).
One 1978 Buick LeSabre, 108 N.M. at 613, 775 P.2d at 1330.
Id. at 614, 775 P.2d at 1331.
Id.at 613, 775 P.2d at 1330.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Instead, at the outset of trial, the court decided to dispense with preliminary
matters, including the motion to compel.3 62 The court heard oral argument
on the matter and suggested a continuance to resolve the discovery problem,
but neither attorney agreed. 63 The judge then orally granted a default
judgment against Kinshaw for Kinshaw's "bad faith . . . use of the Fifth
Amendment privilege to [avoid] questions which are not even reasonably
related to it." 364
On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals started with the premise
that a party may object to interrogatories or requests for production
under New Mexico procedural rules without seeking a protective order.165
It is then necessary for the party seeking discovery to challenge the
objections, ordinarily by seeking a court order compelling discovery pursuant to New Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure 1-037(A). 366 Violation of
a court order compelling discovery could then lead to various sanctions,
including a default judgment.167 In this case, however, the court noted
that this was not the procedure that was followed.3 68 The district court
never ordered Kinshaw to comply with discovery prior to entering the

default

369

The court went on to state that rule 1-037(D) confers authority upon
the district court to order a default even in the absence of a court order
compelling discovery.37 0 However, this remedy should only be used by the
court in "particularly egregious" circumstances, such as when a party
serves a baseless objection in response to a discovery request that is
"tantamount to a failure to respond. ' ' 37 1 In this case, Kinshaw's objections
were not baseless, but were instead founded on a "colorable" claim that
he could not be forced to provide information which could later be used
against him in criminal proceedings.3 72 The court remanded the case to
the trial court to determine the merits of Kinshaw's objection, and, if
proper, to enter an order compelling discovery.3 73 If Kinshaw failed to
comply with this order, or if the trial court determined that Kinshaw's
objections were completely without merit, then the court could impose
374

sanctions .

The decision in One 1978 Buick LeSabre confirms that the court normally
encourages remedial relief for discovery non-compliance. As a general
rule, a litigant should be provided with the opportunity to be heard
regarding his objections to discovery requests before the court orders a

362. Id.
363. Id.

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

at 614, 775 P.2d at 1331.

Id.
Id.
Id.; N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-037(A).
One 1978 Buick LeSabre, 108 N.M. at 614, 775 P.2d at 1331.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 614-15, 755 P.2d at 1331-32.
Id.at 615, 755 P.2d at 1332.
Id.
Id.
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default, provided the party is proceeding with discovery in good faith.
This holding provides trial courts with a general rule and further guidance
on the proper procedure for compelling discovery and sanctioning noncompliance. One 1978 Buick LeSabre contrasts nicely with Sandoval, which
provided the exception to the general use of court discovery sanctions;
i.e., when a litigant proceeds with discovery in willful bad faith, such as
by lying in discovery, the court may order a default or dismissal as the
first discovery sanction.
VI.

TRIAL

During the survey period, the courts had two occasions to consider
who should bear the cost of expert witnesses. First, in Jimenez v. Foundation Reserve Insurance Co., 371 the court addressed the issue of whether
a prevailing party in a lawsuit may recover fees for expert witnesses who
did not testify. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that such fees
are not recoverable. The New Mexico Supreme Court had previously stated
that the right of a prevailing party to recover costs incurred in litigation
was via statutory authority, or via a rule of the court as authorized by
statute.3 76 The statute in this case, section 39-3-30 of the New Mexico
Statutes, which is applicable to costs for experts, provides that the district
judge may order payment of a reasonable fee "for any witness who
qualifies as 3an expert and who testifies in the case in person or by
deposition." 77
In Jimenez, the plaintiff, Angelo Jimenez, brought a declaratory judgment action against his insurance company, Foundation Reserve Insurance
Co. ("Foundation"), the defendant. 78 Jimenez was seeking a determination
of his entitlement to stack uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage applying to two cars for which he had purchased insurance under a single
policy.3 79 The policy contained a limit-of-liability clause that prohibited
stacking of uninsured/underinsured benefits. 380 The trial court ruled in
favor of Jimenez. 311 Subsequently, Jimenez filed a cost bill which included
fees for two expert witnesses who attended a hearing that was vacated
testimony being taken.38 2 The cost bill was approved by the
without their
383
trial court.
In appealing the trial court's decision, Foundation objected to paying
3 4
the expert witness fees because the experts did not testify. 8 The New

375. 107 N.M. 322, 757 P.2d 792 (1988).
376. Id. at 327, 757 P.2d at 797 (citing New Mexico Bureau of Revenue v. Western Elec. Co.,
89 N.M. 468, 469, 553 P.2d 1275, 1276 (1976)).
377. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-30 (Supp. 1989).
378. Jimenez, 107 N.M. at 323, 757 P.2d at 793.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.at 323-24, 757 P.2d at 793-94.
384. Id.at 327, 757 P.2d at 797.
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Mexico Supreme Court agreed with Foundation.3"5 The court based its
holding on the requirements set forth in section 39-3-30.316 First, the
witness "must qualify as an expert, and, second, the expert must testify
at the trial or by deposition. ' 387 In this case, there was no contention
that the witnesses were not experts; however, the witnesses did not testify
at any time.3"' Because the statute did not
authorize fees for courthouse
38 9
attendance, the fees were not allowed.
In a second expert witness fees case, In re Sanders,3 9 the New Mexico
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether the district court or the
Administrative Office of the Courts was required to pay the cost of an
independent expert witness appointed by the district court.391 The court
of appeals concluded that the payment for a court-appointed independent
expert witness was to be made by the district court. 392
Sanders concerned an appeal of a judgment denying revocation of
treatment guardianship of the petitioner, William Sanders. 393 The case also
addressed the cross-appeal of a segment of the judgment whereby the
respondent, the Health and Environment Department ("HED"), was required to pay Sander's expert witness's fee. 94 The Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code does not provide for appointment of an
independent mental health professional in proceedings to determine whether
or not a treatment guardian should be designated for a party. 95 In spite
of the Code, the court stated that the constitutional right of due process
may require such an appointment for an indigent in certain circumstances, 96
and the court may appoint an independent expert pursuant to New Mexico
Rule of Evidence 11-706(A).3 97 HED did not object to petitioner's motion
to appoint an expert, and the only relief sought by HED in its motion
for reconsideration was that it not be compelled to pay the cost of the
expert.3 9 Therefore, the sole issue the court considered was who should
pay for the expert appointed pursuant to authority outside of the Metal
Health and Developmental Disabilities Code.399
In addressing this issue, the court of appeals specifically addressed New
Mexico Rules of Evidence 11-706(A)40 and 11-706(B). 401 The court stated

385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.

388. Id.
389. Id.
390. 108 N.M. 434, 773 P.2d 1241 (Ct. App. 1989).

391. Id. at 440, 773 P.2d at 1247.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 435, 773 P.2d at 1242.
394. Id.

395. Id. at 439, 773 P.2d at 1246.
396. Id. (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)).
397. Id.

398. Id. at 440, 773 P.2d at 1247.
399. Id.
400. Id. N.M. R. Evm. 11-706(A) provides that "a trial judge is expressly authorized to appoint
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that rule 11-706(B) authorized "the trial court to appoint an independent
expert unaligned with either party to assist the court in determining
significant issues in the proceeding."4' The trial court did not follow the
procedures set out in rule 11-706. 4° This fact was significant because HED
never complained about the procedure used in appointing the expert.
The court also noted that the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted
guidelines for the payment of witness fees. 4 The court stated that "expert
witnesses called by a state agency pursuant to the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code shall be paid by the state agency, and
experts called by court-appointed attorneys shall be paid by the district
courts." 401 Based on the New Mexico Supreme Court's guidelines, the
court concluded that petitioner's expert's fees were to be paid from the
funds of the district court, and not from HED funds. s
VII.

JUDGMENTS

During the survey period, the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed
one new issue in the area of summary judgment. In addition, the New
Mexico Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a court has the
power to determine issues raised in a declaratory judgment complaint
arising out of an arbitration contract before it decides whether arbitration
is required.
Summary Judgment
The New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed summary judgment in
the context of a comparative negligence suit. Trujillo v. TreatW explored
the question of whether comparative negligence is a question of law or
a question of fact. The court concluded that summary judgment is not
proper when there is a question of fact, but summary judgment is proper
when there is a question law.4 In determining the answer to the above
A.

an expert witness where he or she determines that it is necessary to aid the court in discharging its
official duty."
401. In re Sanders, 108 N.M. at 440, 773 P.2d at 1247. N.M. R. Evm. 11-706(B) provides for
the manner of payment, indicating that the court shall determine the amount of reasonable compensation
for such expert's services and that
the compensation thus fixed is payable from funds which may be provided by law
in criminal cases and civil actions and proceedings involving just compensation under
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 2 of
the New Mexico Constitution. In other civil actions and proceedings the compensation
shall be paid by the parties in such proportion and such time as the judgment
directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.
402. In re Sanders, 108 N.M. at 440, 773 P.2d at 1247.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. 107 N.M. 58, 752 P.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1988).
408. Id. at 59, 752 P.2d at 251.
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question, the court of appeals restated the existing law of summary
judgment.4 0
Trujillo concerned a wrongful death action brought by Kenneth Trujillo,
as personal representative of the estate of Henry Trujillo, against Linda
Treat and Thomas Treat. 410 The decedent, Henry Trujillo, was struck and
killed by a vehicle driven by Linda Treat in which her husband, Thomas
Treat, was a passenger. 41' Trujillo appealed an order granting summary
412
judgment to the Treats and dismissing the wrongful death action.
Trujillo argued that under New Mexico's comparative negligence law,
the question of whether the Treats saw or should have seen the decedent
prior to impact so as to avoid fatally injuring him was a genuine issue
of material fact subject to a jury's determination. 413 In response, Linda
Treat stated that summary judgment was proper because she could do
nothing to avoid hitting decedent and therefore the accident was unavoidable. 41 4 The court asked whether reasonable minds could differ as to
whether Linda Treat maintained a proper lookout and exercised ordinary
415
care in driving her vehicle.
The court held that summary judgment is not proper where there are
conflicting material facts or where an inference exists as to whether
defendant was comparatively negligent. 4 6 The court could not say as a
matter of law that there were no issues of material fact. 417 The issue of
Linda Treat's alleged negligence was not properly subject to resolution
41
as a matter of law; therefore, the court decided to reverse and remand.
B.

Declaratory Judgments
In Guaranty National Insurance Co. v. Valdez,4 9 the New Mexico
Supreme Court decided whether district courts, when faced with suits
involving arbitration contracts, have the power to consider issues raised
in a declaratory judgment complaint before deciding if arbitration is

409. Id. The court stated that
[s]ummary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The movant need only make
a prima facie showing that he is entitled to summary judgment. Upon making a
prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to
show at least a reasonable doubt as to whether a genuine issue exists. When considering
a motion for summary judgment, the district court must give the party opposing
the motion the benefit of all reasonable doubt in determining whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Even where basic facts are undisputed, if logical but
conflicting inferences can be drawn from the facts, summary judgment should be
denied.

Id. (citations omitted).
410. Id.
411. Id.

412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.

415. Id.at 61, 752 P.2d at 253.
416.
417.
418.
419.

Id.
Id.
Id.
107 N.M. 764, 764 P.2d 1322 (1988).
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required. The court held that a district court does420have the power to
consider such issues prior to mandating arbitration.
Guaranty, the insurer, filed a complaint against its insured, Valdez,
seeking a declaratory judgment concerning issues of coverage for an
automobile accident. 421 The complaint was dismissed by the district court,
which held that the dispute was required to go through arbitration pursuant
to the contract (insurance policy) terms. 422 Guaranty appealed the decision.423 The issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in granting
Valdez' motion to dismiss Guaranty's complaint for declaratory judgment.4 24 In addressing this issue, the court discussed the relationship
425
between the Uniform Arbitration Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act.
In reaching its decision, the court reiterated its previous holding that
a trial court's exercise of discretion to grant or refuse declaratory relief
under section 44-6-7 of the Declaratory Judgment Act must be based on
good reason. 426 Based on that holding, the court determined that the trial
court in the instant case had not exercised sound reasoning in refusing
to consider Guaranty's complaint for declaratory judgment.4 27 The court
then remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to consider
the legal issues raised in the complaint before it ruled on the question
of whether arbitration was mandated by the insurance contract. 2 8
The court based its holding on the rationale that a complaint for
declaratory judgment raises questions of law arising from disputed interpretations of an arbitration contract and, therefore, the proper forum
for resolution of such questions is the trial court.4 29 The court reasoned
that where one of the parties to an arbitration agreement resists arbitration
and seeks a determination of the legal questions by the court, then that
party must be heard by the court regarding that issue. 4 0 The trial court
the parties have
may not abdicate its jurisdiction without deciding whether
431
complaint.
the
in
raised
issues
the
arbitrate
to
agreed
In reaching its decision, the court relied on the holdings of other
jurisdictions. For example, the court cited a Virginia case that held that
it is within the province of the courts to determine the threshold question
of arbitrability.4 32 The court also cited a policy reason for its holding

420. Id. at 766, 764 P.2d at 1324.
421. Id. at 765, 764 P.2d at 1323.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 766, 764 P.2d at 1324.
426. Id. (citing Sunwest Bank of Clovis v. Clovis IV, 106 N.M. 149, 154, 740 P.2d 699, 704
(1987)).
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id.; see Doyle and Russel, Inc. v. Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n, 213 Va. 489, 493-94, 193 S.E.2d
662, 666 (1973) (because a party must initially decide to arbitrate and he cannot be forced to arbitrate
a question which is not arbitrable under his agreement, the resisting party is entitled to a judicial
determination of arbitrability).
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that concerned the review of arbitrator's awards. Specifically, the court
restated a United States Court of Appeals decision which held that "upon
judicial review of an arbitrator's award 'the court's function in ...
vacating an arbitration award is severely limited' . . . . -433 Under New
Mexico's version of the Uniform Arbitration Act, the fact that the relief
granted by the arbitrators is such that it could not or would not be
granted by a court of law or equity is not grounds for vacating or refusing
4 34
to confirm the award.
VIII.

PRECLUSION

During the survey period, the only substantive changes that the New
Mexico appellate courts made in the area of preclusion involved issue
preclusion; i.e., collateral estoppel. There were two modifications of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel in New Mexico. In order to apply collateral
estoppel, the litigant must establish four elements: (1) the parties against
whom collateral estoppel is to be applied must be the same as in the
original action or in privity with parties in the original action, and the
parties against whom collateral estoppel will be used must have been given
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues to be estopped; (2) the
cause of action must be different; (3) the issues must have been actually
litigated; and (4) the issues must have been necessarily determined. 435
In a case of first impression, the New Mexico Court of Appeals decided
whether a lessee of realty has sufficient privity with the lessor for purposes
of asserting collateral estoppel in subsequent litigation. 436 The court's
analysis of privity included an unnecessary "against whom" and full and
fair opportunity to litigate discussion. Reeves v. Wimberly initially involved
a dispute between a lessor, Miller, and a lessee, Reeves. 437 Reeves leased
a trailer court from Miller and refused to vacate the premises when the
lease terminated on September 30, 1985.43 Reeves alleged that she and
Miller had an oral agreement to extend the lease to 1987.439 Miller argued
that the lease ended in September of 1985, and that he subsequently
agreed to lease the land to Wimberly beginning October 1, 1985.4 0 Miller
sued Reeves in an action alleging forcible entry and unlawful detainer
and prevailed.' The court found that the oral negotiations never concluded
with an agreement of a lease extension and awarded Miller damages and
possession of the property." 2

433. Guaranty, 107 N.M. at 767, 764 P.2d at 1325 (quoting Office of Supply, Gov't of Republic
of Korea v. New York Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972)). In the second circuit
case, the court construed the United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947), which
bears substantial similarities to the New Mexico version of the Uniform Arbitration Act.
434. Guaranty,. 107 N.M. at 767, 764 P.2d at 1325.
435. International Paper Co. v. Farrar, 102 N.M. 739, 700 P.2d 642 (1985).
436. Reeves v. Wimberly, 107 N.M. 231, 755 P.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1988).
437. Id. at 232, 755 P.2d at 76.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 233, 755 P.2d at 77.
442. Id.
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Subsequently, Reeves filed a lawsuit against Wimberly and Miller. Reeves
alleged her reliance on the breach of Miller's oral representations made
to her and that Miller and Wimberly had jointly conspired to defraud
her." 3 Both Miller and Wimberly filed motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment.4" The district court granted Miller's motions based on the
defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel."' The district court also
granted Wimberly's motion based on collateral estoppel, finding that
Wimberly was in privity with Miller in the previous dispute. 4 6 Privity
notwithstanding, the court said that the party seeking to use collateral
estoppel "does not have to have been a party, or in privity with a party,
to the previous action." 441
In dicta, the court discussed the doctrine of collateral estoppel and, in
particular, privity. In deciding the issue of privity, the court looked to
Myers v. Olson.44 Myers held that a grantee in privity with a grantor
of realty may assert the defense of res judicata, provided the previous
judgment was rendered before the property was conveyed. 4 9 The Reeves
court applied the Myers analysis and ruled that a lessee can raise the
defense of collateral estoppel against a plaintiff if the lessee took possession
of the leasehold property after the beginning of the first suit and with
actual or constructive notice of the "pendency of the original action.' '450
Further, the court reasoned that New Mexico is now a modern jurisdiction, whereby the traditional rule of privity does not apply. 4 1 If the
party against whom the doctrine is to be applied was a party, or was in
privity with a party, in the earlier lawsuit and had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issues to be estopped, collateral estoppel may
be applied to preclude issues in the subsequent suit if the issues were
previously actually litigated and necessarily determined. 45 2 The court reasoned that the argument for barring collateral estoppel turned not on
privity but on whether Reeves had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issues of the lease extension. 45 3 Because Reeves had been involved in
the prior action and had asserted this same argument, the court decided
that Reeves had had the opportunity to fully litigate the lease extension
was collaterally estopped from subsequently relitigating this
and thus
54
claim.
Reeves v. Wimberly has important implications for the practicing attorney. First, if a lessee is in privity with his lessor, he can raise the

443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 234, 755 P.2d at 78.
100 N.M. 745, 676 P.2d 882 (1984).
Id. at 746, 676 P.2d at 883 (emphasis added).
Reeves, 107 N.M. at 234, 755 P.2d at 78.
Id.; see M.E. OCCHIAI NO, supra note 46, at 12-40.
Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
Reeves, 107 N.M. at 235, 755 P.2d at 79.
Id.
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defense of collateral estoppel against the plaintiff if the lessee took possession of the leasehold property after the commencement of the legal
action. Second, when a plaintiff has had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate a claim in the first action, he will be collaterally estopped from
reasserting that claim. Collateral estoppel should be applied only when
the trial judge determines that its application would not be fundamentally
unfair. Reeves reaffirmed the "against whom" rule and confirmed New
Mexico's adoption of the modern rule on privity.
During the survey period, the New Mexico appellate courts also examined
whether issues in a previous lawsuit which ended in a default judgment
have been actually litigated for collateral estoppel purposes. In Blea v.
Sandoval,411 the court of appeals decided that a default judgment in a
previous lawsuit did not have any collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent
lawsuit.
The collateral estoppel doctrine is based on the "premise that a thorough
1
fact-finding process was completed in the first proceeding. 45
6 This pertains
to "all matters actually litigated and determined in the first action and
essential to the judgment. ' 457 It applies to matters which have been actually
458
litigated, but not to those which could have been litigated but were not.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when a party against whom
a judgment is sought fails to plead or otherwise defend, that party is in
45 9
default and the court may enter a default judgment against that party.
Therefore, no issues are actually litigated in a default judgment, and issue
preclusion does not apply if this rule is interpreted narrowly.
The facts in Blea involved a longtime family dispute. George Sandoval
and his wife, Felicita, moved onto the property in question in 1944.4w
In 1982, the plaintiffs filed a quiet title action to the land.4' The plaintiffs'
claims were dismissed with prejudice and the court issued an order defaulting George Sandoval.4 2 Felicita Sandoval's title to the property was
affirmed.463 She died shortly after the decision, and the plaintiffs filed
an action seeking to eject George Sandoval from the land.4
The defendant claimed that the earlier suit barred the plaintiffs from
relitigating their claim because of .the doctrine of res judicata.4 5 However,
the district court rejected the defendant's argument and granted the plaintiffs' claim for an ejectment.4 The defendant appealed.4 7

455. 107 N.M. 554, 761 P.2d 432 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988).
456. Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L.
REV. 623, 648 (1988).
457. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980).
458. Id.
459. FED. R. Civ. P. 55.
460. Blea, 107 N.M. at 556, 761 P.2d at 434.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
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On appeal, the court of appeals examined whether collateral estoppel
or res judicata applied to the claim. The court held that collateral estoppel,
rather than res judicata, was the applicable doctrine because the quiet
title action was a completely different cause of action than plaintiffs'
earlier ejectment action.46 The court held that the defendant could litigate
the issue of superior title as a defense to ejectment. 6 9 The court said
that the defendant was not collaterally estopped from litigating the issue
because there is no collateral estoppel effect for a default judgment. 470
The court found that there is ample authority for the proposition that
a default judgment does not have collateral estoppel effect because there
would not be a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues. 47' The
court noted, however, that it may be proper to accord default judgments
a res judicata effect. 472
The court based its holding on the rationale that collateral estoppel
bars only the consideration of issues that have been actually litigated and
determined by a final judgment. 473 In a default judgment, the issues are
not actually litigated. 474
For the practicing attorney, the implications for applying collateral
estoppel are obvious. In a modern jurisdiction such as New Mexico, an
action must meet all of the elements of collateral estoppel. The parties
against whom collateral estoppel is applied must be the same as in the
original action or in privity with one another and have had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the original action. Additionally,
the issues must have been actually litigated and necessarily determined. 475
In other words, each litigant must be given his "day in court."
IX.

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT/SETTING ASIDE A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT
During the survey period, the supreme court considered the standards
that a movant must meet to demonstrate the existence of a meritorious
defense when seeking to set aside a default judgment. 476 In New Mexico,
a party seeking relief from a default judgment under rule 1-060(B)(1) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure 477 must demonstrate the grounds for relief
and that he or she possessed a meritorious defense. 478 Generally, the trial
479
court's finding of a meritorious defense is within the court's discretion.

468. Id. at 558, 761 P.2d at 436.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 557, 761 P.2d at 435; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980).
474. Blea, 107 N.M. at 558, 761 P.2d at 436.
475. International Paper Co. v. Farrar, 102 N.M. 739, 700 P.2d 642 (1985) (emphasis added).
476. Sunwest Bank v. Roderiguez, 108 N.M. 211, 770 P.2d 533 (1989).
477. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-060(B)(l) lists the possible reasons for which the court may relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding. The list includes mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.
478. Rodriguez v. Conant, 105 N.M. 746, 749, 737 P.2d 527, 530 (1987).
479. Id. at 749, 737 P.2d at 530.
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The object is to ascertain whether there is some possibility that the outcome
of the suit after trial will be different from the result achieved by entering
a default. 410
Prior to these developments, the courts recognized that "there is no
universally accepted standard as to what satisfies the requirement that a
party show a meritorious defense.' '481 In finding a meritorious defense,
the trial courts used their sound discretion, and in making their determinations, the courts were to be liberal.4 2
In Sunwest Bank v. Roderiguez,43 Sunwest Bank ("Sunwest") appealed
a district court's decision to set aside a default judgment against Mrs.
Roderiguez. On February 5, 1988, Sunwest filed a complaint against Mr.
and Mrs. Roderiguez, d/b/a A.R. Roofing Company, for money due on
a promissory note for the roofing business.4" Mrs. Roderiguez was served
personally with a complaint and a summons addressed to her alone.48
Mrs. Roderiguez did not enter an appearance or answer or file any other
responsive 487pleading. 4 Sunwest moved for and was granted a default
judgment.
Ten days after Sunwest obtained the default judgment, Mrs. Roderiguez
moved to set it aside pursuant to rule 60(B)(1).488 Mrs. Roderiguez argued
that her failure to answer was due to excusable neglect and that she
possessed a meritorious defense.8 9 Mrs. Roderiguez asserted in her motion
that she and her husband separated in February 1987, and since that time
she had had no control or connection with the roofing business. 49° She
maintained that she had expected her husband, who had complete control
of the business, to step forward and defend the matter because only he
had the facts and records to answer the complaint. 49' After hearing the
argument, the trial court entered an order setting aside the judgment
finding excusable neglect and a meritorious defense.4 92
On appeal, the supreme court stated that litigants must show a meritorious defense beyond the mere notice requirements that would suffice
if pleaded before the entry of a default judgment. 493 The court cited
several authorities that follow this proposition. 49 The supreme court over-

480. 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2697, at 531
(1983).
481. New Mexico Educators Fed. Credit Union v. Wood, 102 N.M. 16, 17-18, 690 P.2d 1010,
1011-12 (1984) (quoting Springer Corp. v. Herrera, 85 N.M. 201, 203, 510 P.2d 1072, 1074 (1973),
overruled, 108 N.M. 214 (1989)).
482. Rodriguez, 105 N.M. at 749, 737 P.2d at 530.
483. 108 N.M. 211, 770 P.2d 533 (1989).
484. Id. at 212-13, 770 P.2d at 534-35.
485. Id.

486. Id.
487. Id.

488. Id.at 213, 770 P.2d at 535.
489. Id.

490.
491.
492.
493.
494.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 214, 770 P.2d at 536.
Reeves v. Wisenor, 102 Idaho 271, 629 P.2d 667 (1981); United Imports & Exports, Inc. v.
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ruled Springer Corp. v. Herrera495 to the extent that it was contrary to
the requirement of some "material grounds" to support the claims on
which an application for relief depends. 49 The supreme court held:
[T]o establish the existence of a meritorious defense sufficient to warrant
setting aside a default judgment a movant must proffer some statement
of underlying facts to support the allegation .... [A]llegations proffered in an answer or motion must be more than bare legal conclusions
lacking factual support. They must counter the cause of action by
setting497forth relevant legal bounds substantiated by a credible factual
basis.

However, the court decided that the standard for purposes of determining
the merits of a defense should be that facts stated in an answer or motion
should be accepted as true. 491 When the trial courts exercise discretion in
determining whether there is a meritorious defense in an action to set
aside a default judgment, the courts should be liberal. 499 The supreme
court decided that it was appropriate to apply the excusable neglect policy
on a "case by case basis" depending upon the circumstances of each
5
case. 00
The supreme court found no merit to Roderiguez' allegation that her
marital settlement agreement, which required her husband to assume the
debts of the business, absolved her from liability under the promissory
note.501 The court held that the agreement had no effect on the rights
52
of a pre-divorce creditor who was not a party to the agreement. 0
In another decision, Marinchek v. Paige,13 the New Mexico Supreme
Court considered whether Paige failed to satisfy the only grounds available
to him to reopen a final judgment under rule 60(B) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure or whether rule 55 was an alternative method for reopening
a default judgment. During a motions hearing, Paige's attorney informed
the court that he was encountering difficulty communicating with his
client. 504 Counsel then moved to withdraw because he had had no contact
with Paige in the previous five months and had been unable to contact
him.50 5 The district court entered a default judgment against Paige on
November 25, 1985 because neither Paige nor his counsel made an entry
of appearance. 506
Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 43, 653 P.2d 691 (1982); Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer Serv.,
Inc., 524 So. 2d 600 (Ala. 1988); Peterson v. La Croix, 420 N.W.2d 18 (S.D. 1988); United States
Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, Inc., 664 P.2d 121 (Wyo. 1983).
495. 85 N.M. 201, 510 P.2d 1072 (1973), overruled, 108 N.M. 211, 770 P.2d 533 (1989).
496. Sunwest, 108 N.M. at 214, 770 P.2d at 536.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 215, 770 P.2d at 537.
499. Id. at 214, 770 P.2d at 536.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 216, 770 P.2d at 538.
502. Id. (citing New Mexico Educators Fed. Credit Union v. Woods, 102 N.M. 16, 18, 690 P.2d
1010, 1012 (1984)).
503. 108 N.M. 349, 772 P.2d 879 (1989).
504. Id. at 350, 772 P.2d at 880.
505. Id.
506. Id.
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In August 1987, Paige contacted his former attorney, who informed
him of the judgment entered in November of 1985. 507 Paige's present
attorney then moved to vacate the judgment.5°s After two hearings concerning Paige's absence from the state, confusion as to his last known
address, his ignorance of the intervening proceedings, and his claim of
a meritorious defense, the trial court ordered the judgment vacated and
the case set for trial. 509 The judgment was vacated twenty-one months
after the default judgment was entered. 10
The creditor, Marinchek, appealed the trial court's decision to vacate
the default judgment. 1' Paige's contention was that the trial court had
the authority under rule 55(C) to set aside the judgment independently
of rule 60.512 Under rule 55(C), the trial court can set aside an entry of
default for good cause.513 However, the court may likewise set aside a
default judgment in accordance with rule 60.1' 4 Paige relied on the phrase
"may likewise" and argued that the court had the discretion to set aside
a default judgment "for good cause shown" under rule 55, and was not
confined to the requirements of rule 60. 511 Paige also relied on Starnes
v. Starnes,1 6 which held that compliance with the requirements of rule
60 is optional in a petition to vacate a judgment.
Rejecting Paige's argument, the supreme court held that Starnes imprecisely spoke of "good cause shown" regarding substantial evidence to
comply with rules 55(C) or 60(B).5 17 The supreme court was satisfied that
"regardless of whether the word 'likewise' referred to 'good cause shown,'
any showing of good cause to set aside a judgment by default must be
in 'accordance with Rule 60."'518 The supreme court held that default

507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. N.M. R. Crv. P. 1-055(C) provides that "[flor good cause shown, the court may set aside
an entry of default and, if a judgment by default had been entered, may likewise set it aside in
accordance with Rule 1-060." Marinchek, 108 N.M. at 350, 772 P.2d at 880.
514. According to rule 1-060, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from final
judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered
in time to move for a new trial under [N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-059];
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation
or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void; . . . or
(5) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and
(3) not more than one-year [sic] after the judgment, order or .proceeding was entered
or taken.
N.M. R. Crv. P. 1-060.
515. Marinchek, 108 N.M. at 350, 772 P.2d at 880.
.516. 72 N.M. 142, 381 P.2d 423 (1963).
517. Marinchek, 108 N.M. at 351, 772 P.2d at 881.
518. Id.; see Kutz v. Independent Publishing Co., 101 N.M. 587, 589, 686 P.2d 277, 279 (Ct.
App. 1984).
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judgments must be set aside in accordance with rule 60. 511 The court also
noted an exception regarding judgments still under the court's control
pursuant to section 39-1-1 of the New Mexico Statutes. 20
The supreme court recognized that Paige couched his argument in terms
of rule 60(B)(1), excusable neglect, and premised his motion on the ground

of a due process violation.52' The supreme court believed that the trial

court's decision to vacate the judgment may have been animated by its
perception that Paige did not receive due process.5 2 In reviewing the
evidence of the case, however, the supreme court concluded that there

was no violation of due process.523 Paige failed to satisfy the only ground

available to him to reopen a final judgment under Rule 60(B).12 The
supreme court decided that because there was no violation of due process,
the November 25, 1985 default judgment was not void.5 25 The supreme
court reversed the trial court's order to5 26set aside the judgment against
Paige and reinstated the 1985 judgment.
X.

APPEALS

During the survey period, New Mexico appellate courts decided cases
concerning final judgments and exceptions, appellate jurisdiction, abuse
of process, appellate costs, and the clearly erroneous standard of review.
A.

Final Judgments and Exceptions
In Schleft v. Board of Education of Los Alamos, 5 27 the court of appeals
considered whether the pendency of the amount of costs to be awarded
to a party renders an otherwise final judgment nonfinal and nonappealable.

519. Marinchek, 108 N.M. at 351, 772 P.2d at 881.
520. Id.
Final judgments and decrees, entered by district courts in all cases tried pursuant
to the provisions of this section shall remain under the control of such courts for
a period of thirty days after the entry thereof, and for such further time as may
be necessary to enable the court to pass upon and dispose of any motion which
may have been filed within such period, directed against such judgment; provided,
that if the court shall fail to rule upon such motion within thirty days after the
filing thereof, such failure to rule shall be deemed a denial thereof; and, provided
further, that the provisions of this section shall not be construed to amend, change,
alter or repeal the provisions of sections 4227 or 4230, code 1915.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-1-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
521. Marinchek, 108 N.M. at 351-52, 772 P.2d at 881-82.
522. Id. at 352, 772 P.2d at 882.
523. The court stated,
Due to the inability of counsel to contact his client and the client's failure to contact
either his counsel or the court, it was ordered that counsel be allowed to withdraw,
and that Paige or new counsel either make an appearance within thirty days or the
court would enter judgment against him by default. The actual notice to Paige's
counsel that Paige risked default judgment if Paige did not comply with the court's
order was chargeable to Paige.
Id.
524. Id. at 353, 772 P.2d at 883.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. 107 N.M. 56, 752 P.2d 248 (Ct. App. 1988).
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The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the pendency of a proceeding
solely to determine the amount of costs does not render an otherwise
final judgment nonfinal.528
Schleft concerned the appeal of a dismissal, with prejudice, of plaintiffs'
claims for personal injury against the defendant. 529 The judgment dismissing
the claims also awarded the defendant its reasonable costs.530 The New
Mexico Court of Appeals then issued a calendar notice proposing to
dismiss the appeal for two reasons. First, the record proper indicated that
plaintiffs had objected to defendant's cost bill. 3' Second, action in the
trial court was still contemplated on the issue, therefore rendering the
judgment nonfinal.53 2 Instead, the court ordered the parties to brief the
issue.

533

The court held that the pendency of the cost determination did not
render the judgment nonfinal. 34 In support of this holding, the court
stated that a proceeding to fix the amount of costs is a proceeding to
carry out the judgment allowing costs. 5 35 Therefore, the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine the amount of costs after the notice of appeal
was filed. 36 The court additionally relied on Johnson v. C & H Construction Co.537 In Johnson the court had previously determined that a
judgment deferring the issue of attorney's fees is neither final nor appealable.5 38 The case was, however, factually distinguishable from Schleft.53 9
The court went on to state that costs do not necessarily represent a
claim for relief in an action. 5 4 Usually, where costs are awarded in a
judgment of dismissal, costs were not included among the defendant's
claims for relief.5 41 Instead, costs are awarded based on the defendant's
having prevailed against the claim for relief.5 42 Therefore, the court stated
that the failure to fix the amount of costs is not a failure to adjudicate
a claim for relief under rule 1-054(C).143 Furthermore, costs may be taxed
by the district court clerk without further proceedings, while the amount
of attorney's fees in workers' compensation actions is determined by the
district court. 5 "
The court further noted that its holding is in line with federal case
law.5 45 One federal case, Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 5" addressed

528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.

Id. at 57, 752 P.2d at 249.
Id. at 56, 752 P.2d at 248.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 57, 752 P.2d at 249.
Id.
Id.
Id.(citing Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Anaya, 78 N.M. 101, 428 P.2d 640 (1967)).
78 N.M. 423, 432 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1967).
Id. at 425, 432 P.2d at 269.
Schleft, 107 N.M. at 57, 752 P.2d at 249.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing N.M. R. Crv. P. 1-054(E); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-30) (Repl. Pamp. 1991)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
530 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976), overruled, Croker v. Boeing Co.,
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a trial court's award of attorney's fees as part of the case in an antitrust
action without fixing the amount of fees awarded. The New Mexico Court
of Appeals pointed out that the Baughman court found that the failure
to determine the amount of fees did not render the judgment nonfinal
for purposes of appeal.5 47 In considering the federal decision, the New
Mexico court stated that if the plaintiffs in this case had appealed the
award of costs, the appeal as to costs would have been dismissed for
lack of a final order.5 4 Furthermore, if the plaintiffs wished to appeal
as to costs, they would have been required to file a separate appeal from
5 49
an order fixing the award after the order was entered.
5
In Allen v. Board of Education of Albuquerque, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals considered the applicability of Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp.5 5' In Cohen, the United States Supreme Court held
that there is a limited class of cases where an interlocutory decision will
"finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be
'
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." 552
The Cohen collateral
order doctrine is an exception to the general rule that only final judgments
are appealable. The Cohen exception allows for an immediate appeal of
orders that are final with respect to matters that are collateral to and
completely separate from the merits of an underlying case. 53 In New
Mexico, the standard has been to authorize appeals within thirty days
from an interlocutory order which "practically disposes of the merits.' ' 54
In Allen, the New Mexico Court of Appeals considered whether to
apply the collateral order exception announced in Cohen.55 5 In Allen, the
plaintiff, Michael Allen, brought suit against the Albuquerque School
Board for injuries suffered in an accident.55 6 The board members filed a
motion for dismissal and summary judgment, asserting immunity under
the Tort Claims Act.5 5 7 The district court granted the board's motion on
two counts and denied it as to the remaining counts regarding negligence
in transporting students.5 8 Following the trial court's denial of applications
for interlocutory appeal, the board sought direct appeal from the trial
court's order that denied its motion for dismissal and summary judgment
on the remaining two counts as a matter of right. 55 9
546. 530 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976), overruled, Croker v. Boeing Co.,
662 F.2d 975, 984 (3d Cir. 1981).
547. Schleft, 107 N.M. at 57-58, 752 P.2d at 249-50.
548. Id. at 58, 752 P.2d at 250.
549. Id.
550. 106 N.M. 673, 748 P.2d 516 (Ct. App. 1987).
551. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
552. Id. at 546.
553. Id.
554. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
555. Allen, 106 N.M. at 674, 748 P.2d at 517.
556. Id.
557. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to -29 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
558. Allen, 106 N.M. at 674, 748 P.2d at 517.
559. Id.
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At issue on appeal was whether the Cohen doctrine applies in New
Mexico. 60 The court declined to address the issue of whether Cohen is
applicable in New Mexico, instead finding that Cohen did not apply to
the case at hand.16' Interestingly, while the court insisted on not applying
the Cohen doctrine, the court, in dicta, explored the Cohen standards
and found that it would not apply. 62 Under Cohen, the court found that
the new action was not collateral to the initial cause63itself and thus should
not be severed from the original cause of action.1
The court reasoned that in determining whether an order is final, a
practical, rather than technical, construction should be used. 564 Because
the defendants conceded that their appeal did not meet the requirements
65
for a final order, the principle allowing appellate review did not apply.
The court also noted that because the defendants had failed to establish
5
a basis for their claim of absolute immunity under the Tort Claims Act, 6
there was no basis for applying the collateral order exception. 67 Following
this rather lengthy analysis of the application of the collateral order
exception, the court dismissed the appeal.5 6
With the decision in Allen, New Mexico courts have yet to formally
adopt the Cohen collateral order doctrine. New Mexico is still a state
which limits appeals to interlocutory appeals which "practically dispose
of the merits" under section 39-3-2. When basing an appeal on this
standard, practicing attorneys should show that a claim is "separable
from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action" and is "too important
to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require
that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."569
Appellate Jurisdiction
As required by the New Mexico Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party
must file a notice of a cross-appeal within ten days of the date the party
is served with notice of an appeal. 70 During the survey period, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals was faced with an issue of first impression in
New Mexico as to whether the failure of a cross-appellant to file a timely
notice of cross-appeal deprives the appellate court of its jurisdiction.
Federal courts adhere to the general principle that untimely filings of

B.

560. Id.
561. Id.at 674-75, 748 P.2d at 517-18.
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id. at 675, 648 P.2d at 518.
565. Id.
566. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
567. Allen, 106 N.M. at 675, 748 P.2d at 518.
568. Id.
569. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
570. N.M. R. App. P. 12-201(A) provides: "If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any
other party may file a notice of appeal within ten (10) days after the date on which the first notice
of appeal was served or within the time otherwise prescribed by this rule, whichever period last
expires."
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notices of cross-appeal will result in a loss of the appellate court's jurisdiction to entertain the cross-appeal. 7' The decision in Olguin v.
Bernalillo 72 resolved the issue of whether, in New Mexico, the failure of
a cross-appellant to file a timely notice of cross-appeal, as required by
rule 12-201(A) and (B) of the Supreme Court Rules, deprives the appellate
court of jurisdiction to entertain the cross-appeal.
In Olguin, the defendant, Bernalillo County Commissioners ("Commissioners"), appealed a declaratory judgment in favor of Olguin but
failed to timely serve a copy of the appeal on Olguin. 71 Olguin filed a
notice of cross-appeal seventy-six days following the date of the filing of
the Commissioners' appeal. 74 The court of appeals entered an order
directing the parties to appear for a hearing about whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the cross-appeal. 7 The facts showed that the certificate
of service was filed in the court of appeals on January 17, 1989.176 Olguin's
attorney first received a copy of the Commissioners' appeal on January
5, 1989, after she had requested a copy of the appeal. 77 Olguin's attorney
mailed a copy of the notice of appeal to Olguin and informed him that
7
she was withdrawing from his case, but Olguin did not open his mail.
His new attorney informed him of the appeal February 12 or 13, 1989,
579
and his notice of cross-appeal was filed February 20, 1989.
Under rule 12-201(A), Olguin had ten days from the date he was served
with the notice of appeal to file his notice of cross-appeal.1' ° Although
Olguin did not request an extension for filing, the appellate court noted
that after sixty days, the district court was without authority to grant
any request pursuant to procedural rules.' Further, Olguin did not cite
any authority to authorize the court to extend the time for filing notices
of appeal and cross-appeal. 5 2 Because the notice of cross-appeal was not
filed within the time required, the court held that it was without jurisdiction
to hear the appeal. 83
The court also found that the Commissioners had failed to serve their
notice of appeal in a timely fashion pursuant to appellate procedural
rules. 5 4 As a sanction, the court ruled that the Commissioners should

571. Rodriguez v. VIZ Metro Transit Sys., 802 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Interstate Agency,
Inc., 760 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. .1985).
572. 109 N.M. 13, 780 P.2d 1160 (Ct. App. 1989).
573. Id. at 14, 780 P.2d at 1161.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. N.M. R. App. P. 12-201(A).
581. Olguin, 109 N.M. at 15, 780 P.2d at 1162; see N.M. R. APP. P. 12-201(E)(4).
582. Olguin, 109 N.M. at 15, 780 P.2d at 1162.
583. Id. at 13, 780 P.2d at 1160.
584. Id. at 15, 780 P.2d at 1162 (citing N.M. R. App. P. 12-202(D)(3), 12-307(B); N.M. R. Cry.
P. 1-005).
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bear some responsibility for the untimely filing of the notice of crossappeal and assessed the Commissioners a fine of $750 and Olguin's
5
attorney's fees of $750 as a sanction for violating appellate rules.
Procedurally, the court's holding means that attorneys will be held to
the strictest standards in interpreting the timeliness rule. If cross-appeals
are not filed within ten days following service of notice of an appeal,
they will not be entertained because the appellate court will be deprived
of its jurisdiction. Conversely, appeals must be served in a timely fashion
or sanctions may be applied.
C. Abuse of Process
The survey period saw an expansion of the definition of abuse of
process in New Mexico. The previous standard for finding abuse of process
in New Mexico was set out in Farmer's Gin Co. v. Ward.51 6 The court
in Farmer'sheld that "[i]n order to sustain an action for abuse of process
two elements are essential, (1) the existence of an ulterior motive; and
(2) an act in the use of process other than such as would be proper in
the regular prosecution of the charge. '58 7 The court elaborated on this
standard in Richardson v. Rutherford."'
In Richardson, a ranch owner accused his ranch manager and his family,
the Rutherfords, of theft and embezzlement and forced them to accompany
8 9
him to a Silver City hotel and enter into a debt settlement agreement.
The agreement involved a transfer of Arizona ranch land to Richardson,
59
for which he agreed to pay a sum to save the land from foreclosure. 1
Following the agreement, Richardson forced the Rutherfords from his
ranch and brought suit against the Rutherfords for conversion, fraud,
and abuse or neglect of buildings and equipment.5 9' The Rutherfords, in
turn, filed a countersuit alleging imprisonment, conversion of personal
property and abuse of the civil process.5 92 The district court awarded
compensatory damages to Richardson and compensatory and punitive
damages to the Rutherfords1 9a The jury found that Richardson threw the
Rutherfords out of the ranch house and forced them to enter into a debt
settlement agreement, but did not specify whether its compensatory and
punitive damages awards were for abuse of process. 594 The judge granted
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Richardson. 95 The Rutherfords
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73 N.M. 405, 389 P.2d 9 (1964).
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appealed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict for abuse of process,
and Richardson cross-appealed.5 9 At issue was whether the filing of a
$3 million lawsuit for an improper ulterior motive was an act upon which
the jury could find abuse of process. 97
On appeal, the court set out the guidelines for limiting the expansion
of liability for abuse of process: (1) the defendant's primary motive was
to accomplish an illegitimate end; and (2) an overt act, designed to effect
this end, was committed. 98 The court noted that the filing of the lawsuit
by Richardson was an overt act attempting to extend the litigation and
designed to intimidate the Rutherfords into settling the dispute. 99 The
court referred to other jurisdictions holding that the required overt act
can be the initiation of litigation.'
Finding that the mere filing of the extravagant lawsuit was based on
ulterior motives, the court held that the abuse of process issue was a
matter for the jury to decide. 60I Because a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict is proper only when the jury could not have reached a verdict
based on the evidence or a permissible inference, the court concluded
that the trial court erred in granting a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict for abuse of process. 602
For the practitioner, Richardson outlines the new standard to be followed
by New Mexico courts in determining abuse of process. The court must
find that: (1) the defendant's primary motive was to accomplish an
illegitimate end; and (2) an overt act designed to effect this end was
committed.
D. Appellate Costs
In Superior Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. David Montoya Construction,
Inc. ,60 the supreme court addressed the issue of whether a court has the
power to award reasonable attorney's fees for an appeal in addition to
allowing an award of attorney's fees incurred at trial. The applicable
statue is section 36-2-39 of the New Mexico Statutes, which provides that
"[iun any civil action in the district court, small claims court or magistrate
court to recover on an open account, the prevailing party may be allowed
a reasonable attorney fee set by the court, and taxed and collected as
costs." 60 Superior concerned an appeal from a judgment entered on an
open account in favor of the plaintiff, Superior Concrete, Inc. 6 5 The
defendant-appellant, David Montoya Construction, Inc., contended that
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the trial court erred in finding an open account, in awarding attorney's
fees, in calculating the rate of interest on the open account, and in finding
a valid modification of the contract that was the subject of this dispute.'
The New Mexico Supreme Court chose to affirm on each point.6
The court, in holding that it could award reasonable attorney's fees
for an appeal, stated that it did not read the statute as specifically limiting
the award of attorney's fees to those fees incurred at the trial level. 60
The court reiterated its previous statement that the statute was designed
"to prevent the threat of litigation as a tactic either to avoid paying just
debts or to enforce false claims.'"'6 The court further reasoned that the
statutory purpose of dissuading parties from litigation on open accounts
would be enhanced by awarding reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
party on appeal, as well as at the trial level. 610 In reaching the above
decision, the court overruled Otis Engineering Corp. v. Grace61 ' and
Southwestern Portland Cement v. Beavers,6 2 cases in which the New
Mexico Supreme Court had concluded that section 36-2-39 did not authorize attorney's fees on appeal.
Clearly Erroneous Standard
An appellate court will generally accept the findings of fact of the trial
court unless a finding is clearly erroneous. 613 The Supreme Court has held
that a finding is clearly erroneous when "although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with' 61 4the
If
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
in the "mixed law and fact" situation the trial court's finding of fact
derives from a correct rule of law, the "clearly erroneous" rule applies
to the finding of fact. 615 If the trial court's judgment is founded on an
that finding must be reversed and remanded for a
incorrect rule of law,
61 6
new determination.
In a comparative negligence action, Sheraden v. Black, 61 7 the court of
appeals reviewed whether a mislabeling of fact is reversible error. While
the question of mislabeling a finding of fact has never specifically been
addressed in New Mexico, the court cited various holdings to support its
court, the court of
conclusions. In determining the intentions of the trial
61 s
appeals applied case law from other jurisdictions.
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The defendant in Sheraden challenged the trial court's determination
of negligence, alleging that the evidence did not support a finding of
negligence.619 The defendant contended that the trial court incorrectly
allocated each party's comparative negligence under a heading of "Conclusions of Law" rather than as a finding of fact.6 20 The appellate court
agreed, but after review of the record concluded that a reversal was not
warranted. 62'
The court said that a mislabeled finding of fact may be treated as 622a
finding even though it may appear under a "Conclusion of Law" heading.
Findings of fact may be supplemented by findings of fact contained in
the judgment entered. 6 3 Citing an earlier New Mexico opinion, the court
said that it is "well settled in New Mexico that the function of a reviewing
court on appeal is to correct erroneous results, not to correct errors that,
even if corrected, would not change the result. "624 The court concluded
that the trial court did not err in failing to adopt specific findings of
fact regarding the comparative negligence of the parties because the evidence supported the ultimate findings of the court. 62 The end result is
that regardless of whether a finding of fact is mislabeled as a conclusion
of law, the appellate court will not remand the case unless the result is
clearly erroneous.
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